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JULY-AUGUST 1980 NO.20



THE ISHI PRESS

Revenge is sweet — Takemiya savours his victory against the background of the Inland Sea.



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The Cover: A comic sketch of fat court ladies engaged in various classical pastimes. Unsigned but probably by Kyosai (1831 – 1899). The octagonal format is typical of designs for summer fans. Printed in the 1890's. (Collection of William Pinckard)

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Takemiya Wins Honinbo Title

Takemiya Masaki 9-dan has won his second Honinbo title, defeating Kato Masao by the resounding margin of 4-1 in the 35th Honinbo title match. Takemiya thus secured his revenge for the 32nd title match in 1977, when he lost the Honinbo title to Kato by the same margin after having held it for only one term.

After four years at the peak of the go world, Kato finally seems to have fallen into that long-predicted slump that comes to all champions sooner or later. Losing the Judan and Honinbo titles in quick succession must be quite a shock for him, so it will be interesting to see if he can hold on to the two titles he has left, the Tengen and the Oza. In contrast, Takemiya seemed to be riding the momentum from his almost perfect record in the league and this led to the surprisingly one-sided result.

The results:

Game 1 (May 15, 16). Takemiya (W) won by 1½ points.

Game 2 (May 28, 29). Takemiya (B) won by resig.

Game 3 (June 11, 12). Kato (B) won by resig.

Game 4 (June 18, 19). Takemiya (B) won by resig.

Game 5 (July 3, 4). Takemiya (W) won by resig.

A complete record of the title match will be presented in our next issue.



The 35th Honinbo, Takemiya Masaki

Otake Gosei Challenger

Otake Hideo, Meijin and Judan, now has a chance to win his third title, as he has earned the right to challenge Cho Chikun in the 5th Gosei title match. Though only best-of-five, this should be an interesting match, for both players are in outstanding form. Ample evidence is presented in this issue to show how well Otake is playing this year, but as far as statistics go, Cho is doing even better. At the moment he has both the best winning percentage of any professional, at 79.3%, and also the highest number of wins, with 23 wins to 6 losses.

Beginning this year, a best-of-three playoff to decide the Gosei challenger has been introduced in this tournament, so in effect the challenger has to play two title matches. Otake became the challenger by defeating Honda Kuniyoshi 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in 2-0 in this playoff, thus giving himself the chance to win back the title he lost to Cho Chikun last year. However, the first game of the title match itself was played on Cho's twenty-



Cho Chikun makes a good start in the 5th Gosei title match.

5th Meijin League (as of 1st August)

Rank	Name	S	K	T	R	C	H	K	H	Y	Score
1	Sakata	—	0	1	0	0		0	0	1	2 — 5
2	Kato	1	—	0		0	1	1	1	1	5 — 2
3	Takemiya	0	1	—	0	0	1	1	1		4 — 3
4	Rin	1		1	—	1	1	0	0	1	5 — 2
5	Cho	1	1	1	0	—	1	0	1	1	6 — 2
6	Hashimoto U.		0	0	0	0	—	1	1	0	2 — 5
7	Kobayashi	1	0	0	1	1	0	—		1	4 — 3
7	Hane	1	0	0	1	0	0		—	0	2 — 5
7	Yamashiro	0	0		0	0	1	0	1	—	2 — 5

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

fourth birthday and Cho celebrated it in appropriate fashion with a win.

Results to date:

Playoff to decide the challenger

Game 1 (June 19). Otake (B) defeated Honda by resignation.

Game 2 (July 3). Otake (W) won by resig.

5th Gosei Title

Game 1 (July 23). Cho (B) won by 3½ points.

Late news: The second game, played on the 1st August, was won by Otake by 1½ points.

Meijin League: Cho Reaches Playoff

Cho Chikun is the first player to finish all his games in the 5th Meijin league and he has ensured himself of a place in a playoff to decide the challenger to Otake Meijin by scoring six wins to two losses. Since the next two players, Rin and Kato, are level on 5—2, the winner of their final round game will meet Cho in a playoff. The early leader of the league, Takemiya, was knocked out of the race when he lost to Rin in the seventh round. Incidentally, Cho is also doing well in the 19th Judan tournament, where he is the first player to reach the semifinals in the winners' section.

Leading Title-winners

Although winning the Honinbo title twice



Cho



Kato



Rin

Meijin challenger?

ranks Takemiya quite high in the honour roll of champions, he trails in the list of total titles won. A listing of the leading title-winners as of July 1980 is given below, but it should be remembered that the younger players have benefited from the great proliferation in titles of the last couple of decades. This of course makes Sakata's appearance

at the top of the list all the more commendable.

Sakata Eio: 61

Otake Hideo: 22

Rin Kaiho: 20

Takagawa Shukaku, Fujisawa Shuko: 18

Ishida Yoshio: 15

Hashimoto Uтарo, Kato Masao: 12

Kobayashi Koichi: 9


Fujisawa Hosai, Ohira Shuzo, Cho Chikun: 7

Takemiya Masaki, Hashimoto Shoji: 5

Shimamura Toshihiro: 4

Iwamoto Kaoru: 3

(Note: Kansai Ki-in tournaments are not included in the totals of the two Hashimotos.)



Sakata 9-dan

5th Kisei: Sakata Wins 9-dan Final

The first stage of the 5th Kisei tournament has finally been completed and the great veteran player Sakata Eio has emerged as the champion 9-dan. A complete list of the dan-winners, together with other place-getters seeded into the second stage, is given below.

1-dan: Shinkai Hiroko

2-dan: Ikezaki Tokinori

3-dan: O Mei-en

4-dan: Kobayashi Kenji

5-dan: Aragaki Takeshi

6-dan: Kanno Kiyonori

7-dan: Fukui Masaaki; 2nd: Nakamura Shidehito

8-dan: Cho Chikun; 2nd: Chino Tadahiko

9-dan: Sakata Eio; 2nd: Hashimoto Shoji (Kansai Ki-in); 3rd: Kojima Takaho and Sekiyama Toshio (K.K.)

The second stage of the tournament has progressed as far as the quarter-finals, where the pairings are Sakata versus Sekiyama and Hashimoto versus Cho. These four players will probably all be seeded into the final stage.

Miyazawa Wins 5th Shinjin-O

The 5th Shinjin-O (king of the new stars) title has been won by Miyazawa Goro 6-dan of the Nihon Ki-in. In the final he defeated Kiyonari Tetsuya 5-dan of the Kansai Ki-in 2-0. He won the first game, played on the 2nd July, by 3½ points, then on the 10th July he clinched the title by winning the second game by 5½ points.

Awaji Wins New Stars Tournament

The 11th New Stars tournament, a TV haya-go tournament sponsored by Channel 12, was won by Awaji Shuzo, who defeated Kori Toshio 5-dan in the final. Awaji also won this tournament in 1978.

Kikuchi Wins Amateur Best Ten

This year one of the strongest fields ever participated in the 20th Amateur Best Ten, held from the 5th to the 7th July in Tokyo. The winner, by half a point, in the final was Kikuchi Yasuro, for many years the top Japanese amateur and a representative of his country in the 1st World Amateur Go championship. The full placings were as follows:

1st: Kikuchi Yasuro

2nd: Kanazawa Moriei

3rd: Murakami Bunsho

4th: Miura Hiroshi

5th: Nishimura Osamu

6th: Hirata Hironori

7th: Harada Minoru

8th: Kobayashi Kunio

9th: Imamura Fumiaki

10th: Yoshimura Masayuki

Gaspari Wins Yugoslav Championship

The 2nd Go Championship of Yugoslavia was held in Belgrade from the 1st to the 4th May, 1980. Sixteen players from all over Yugoslavia took part in the seven round Swiss tournament and the winner was Peter Gaspari 3-dan. Second was Velimir Kuhar 2-dan, while 3rd place was taken by Andrej Flajs 3-dan. Last year's champion, Zoran Mutabzija, was unable to participate.



Robert Rehm of Holland playing Wolfgang Isele of West Germany in the 9th Elsevier International Go Tournament held in Amsterdam in May. Watching is van Frankenhuisen of Holland.



Adam Pirani of the U. K. playing Jurgen Mattern of West Germany in the final game of the Elsevier tournament. Mattern won this game and won the tournament on a tie break.

(Photos by Rob Koopman)

The 9th Elsevier International Go Tournament was held in Amsterdam from the 15th (Ascension Day) to the 18th May. This six round Swiss tournament is open to all players and is the biggest and strongest tournament held outside the Far East. This year a new record was created, with 216 competitors. The tournament venue, the same as last year, was the Weth. Verhey Sporthal, Oranje Vrijstaatkade 27, Amsterdam. This year there were actually too many players for the hall, but the weather was so good that a lot of the players were happy to play outside in the 'garden'.

In the 1st division, for 3 to 6-dan, there were 29 players, with nearly all of the top European players represented. For once the locals did not do very well and the giant-killer was Adam Pirani 4-dan of London. He beat the Dutch favourites one after the other, first Muller, then Rebattu, Rehm and Van Zeijst. However, Pirani ran into Jurgen Mattern, 1979 European champion, in the final round of the tournament and suffered his only defeat. Three other players ended up with a 5-1 score, so a tie-break, based on the sum of opponents' scores, was necessary. The final results:

Division 1 (3 to 6-dan)

1st: Jurgen Mattern 5-1

2nd: Lutz Mattner (West Germany) 5-1

3rd: Adam Pirani 5-1

4th: Matthew Macfadyen (U.K.) 5-1

5th: Van Zeijst 4-2

6th: W. Isele 4-2

7th: J. Hubert (France) 4-2

8th: L. Suc (Yugoslavia) 4-2

9th: C. Muller (Holland) 4-2

10th: R. van Vulpen (Holland) 4-2

11th: R. Moriyama (Japan) 4-2

Below are the winners of some of the other groups:

2-dan group: E. Kaper (Holland)

1-dan group: S. Koolen (Holland)

1-kyu group: M. Willems (Holland)

1979 Hungarian Championship

This championship, held at the beginning of November, was won by Karoly Vekey 2-dan. Second was I. Rigo 2-dan and third was A. Gondor 2-dan.

1980 Budapest International Handicap Go Tour-

nament

This six-round tournament, run on a modified McMahon system, was held at the beginning of May with forty participants from Austria, Poland, East and West Germany and Czechoslovakia, as well as local players. The strongest player was

W. John 4-dan, the East German champion, and the winner was L. Seres 3-kyu of Hungary.

Terry Stacey Challenger for British Championship

The 1980 preliminary tournament of the 1980 British Championship was won by Terry Stacey with a perfect record of eight wins. He will meet the defending champion, Matthew Macfadyen, in a best-of-five series to decide who represents Britain in the next world amateur championship.

The results in the eight round preliminary tournament are given below.

- 1st — Terry Stacey 4-dan: 8—0
- 2nd — Frank May 4-dan: 7—0
- 3rd — Robert Berry 1-dan: 5—3
- 4th — Francis Roads 2-dan: 5—3
- 5th — M. Amin 1-dan: 5—3
- 6th — Adam Pirani 4-dan: 4½—3½
- 7th — D. Jones 3-dan: 4½—3½

1980 German Championship

Sixteen players 3-dan and above participated in this year's German Championship, held in Berlin from the 22nd to the 26th May. This was the strongest field in the seven year history of this event.

Jurgen Mattern 6-dan of Berlin took 1st place with a clean slate of six wins, thus winning the title for the third time. Second was last year's champion, Bernd Wolter 4-dan, while third place was taken by a newcomer, Lutz Mattner, an eighteen year old 3-dan from Garbsen who also did very well in the Elsevier tournament.



Jurgen Mattern

1980 Chinese Tour of Japan

A team of eight Chinese go players toured Japan in June this year to play a series of goodwill matches. One game from the tour, between Nieh and Ishida, is presented in this issue and in the next issue a full report on the tour will be given. The Chinese team record was 32 wins, 24 losses.

Luxembourg International Go Tournament

1st prize: flight-ticket to the Orient

Many other big prizes

The Fuseki Go Club du Luxembourg is organising a large-scale international go tournament, to be held from the 1st to the 3rd May, 1981. The first prize will be a flight-ticket to the Orient (Japan, Korea or Taiwan, according to the wishes of the winner) and there will be many other big prizes.

The tournament will be divided into four divisions, as follows:

Group A: 3-dan and above (Master Group)

Group B: 3-kyu to 2-dan

Group C: 4-kyu to 9-kyu

Group D: Beginners to 10-kyu

The tournament will be run on the Swiss system, with the following time limits:

Group A: 1½ hours, byo-yomi 30 secs., 5 rounds

Group B: 1 hr., 15 mins., 30 secs., 6 rounds

Group C: 1 hr., 30 secs., 8 rounds

Group D: 45mins., 30 secs., 8 rounds

(These details are tentative and will be finalised in August.)

The tournament will be held in Mamer, Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg (5 miles from Luxembourg City).

Entry fee: 300 Belgian francs for members of the German Go Federation

350 Belgian francs for others

Ample cheap accommodation (youth hostel, camping, family pension etc.) will be available and limited private accommodation will also be available.

Contact Address:

FUSEKI

GO CLUB LUXEMBOURG

11, rue de la Liberation

Mamer

4th Eastertide International Tournament: Plzen

The above tournament will be held in Plzen, Czechoslovakia from the 17th to 20th April, 1981. It is a six round handicap tournament run on the Swiss system, with a time allowance of 90 minutes per player. Applications and requests for further information should be addressed to:

ing. Ales Kocek

Plachehe 5

Plzen

Czechoslovakia

2nd World Amateur Go Championship

Final: Imamura v. Ch'en

This final was the second encounter between Imamura and Ch'en in the world championship. Last year Ch'en won their game in the second round of the 1st championship and went on to take third place. This year it was Imamura's chance to get his revenge.

White: Ch'en Chai-jui (China)

Black: Imamura Fumiaki (Japan)

komi: 5½; time: 3 hours each

date: 29th March, 1980




Figure 1 (1 - 46)

Figure 1 (1 - 46)

White 14 is a high-level move, inducing 15 so that White can play 16.

White 20 should be left unplayed, as it loses the aji of a peep at 'a'. White should play immediately at 24; if Black then attached at 20, White could exchange 'b' for Black 'c', then switch to the top left corner.


White 26 is a bad overplay: trying to escape with 14 is unreasonable. White should just play at 28, according to Kajiware, while Sakakibara 9-dan offered the combination of 1 and 3 in Dia. 1. The continuation to 7 there would be satisfactory for White.

White 30. White 'd' is better, according to Kajiware.


Pushing up at 34 gives Black an excellent hane at 35, which is why White's strategy with 26 is



Ch'en Chai-jui



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

bad. Ch'en must have felt that the left side was too big to cede to Black, but his attempt to pull out his stone there got him into a lot of trouble.

White 44. White is being much too stubborn. When Black pushes through at 45, not being able to block at 'e' is very painful for White. Instead of 44, Kajiware advocated following a sacrifice strategy with 1 etc. in Dia. 2.




Figure 2 (47 - 100)

Figure 2 (47 - 100)

Black 47 is a little slack; Black should play 88, White 89, Black 47, making White heavy.


Black 57 is an impatient move; since he is ahead, Black is trying to wind up the game quickly, but starting this fight gives White a chance to get back into the game.

White 64 is well-timed; if Black cuts at 'a', White plays 'b'.

Black 73. Black is just barely ahead in the capturing race at the bottom, but the result here is good for White, as cutting at 70 builds up his right side territory. The game now seems even.

Figure 3 (101 - 127)

Black 5. Probably an oversight by Imamura. This move should be kept in reserve, as Black can play 1 in Dia. 3. White cannot play at 'a', since he would have no answer to Black 'b', but if he plays 'c', he would have only one eye on the side. Since the centre is still open, Black would have no chance of killing White at this stage, but he should at least retain the option of attacking as in Dia. 3.



Dia. 3




Figure 3 (101 - 127)

White 8 is a good point, but White's continuation at 18 is an overplay. Simply enclosing the bottom area with 'a' might have made the game favourable for White.

Black 17. Black would still win the capturing race if he connected at 14, but presumably he does not want to give White forcing moves at 'b' and 'c'.

Black 19, 23. The decisive combination — something has to give in White's position.

Figure 4 (128 - 167)

White resists as best he can, but Black skilfully sets up a ko up to 39. He then continues at the bottom and White is unable to prevent him from





Figure 4 (128 - 167)
43: ko (above 40)

living. White could get a ko by playing 54 at 55, after which Black 54, White 'a', Black 64 would follow, but the burden of this ko would be so great for White that he could not afford to start it.

White 64. Defending in gote here is painful, but if White omits 64, Black can cause a lot of trouble by playing 1 in Dia. 4. White has to play 2, as Black is threatening to start a ko in the corner with 'a', but then Black attacks with 3 and 5, putting White on the spot.



Dia. 4




Figure 5 (168 – 213)
ko (at 79): 82, 109, 112

Figure 5 (168 – 213)

Black 71. If at 72, White has a dangerous hane at 85. Answering patiently with 71 and 73 is the best policy.

White 88. A do-or-die move which is White's last chance. However, Black saw it coming and has prepared a counter, the large-scale exchange of groups with 89 to 95, which finally settles the game beyond doubt. If White defended at 100 with 96, he would be fifteen or sixteen points

behind on the board, so he fights on with 96, even though he has no prospect of success.

From start to finish, this game was a fierce fight, worthy of the final. Imamura's victory redeemed the poor performance of the Japanese players last year.

White resigns after Black 213.

Playoff for 3rd Place

White: Yasunaga Hajime (Japan)

Black: Liu Hsiao-kuang (China)

date: 29th March, 1980





Figure 1 (1 – 40)
37: at 19

Figure 1 (1 – 40)


White 26 is probably a new move. White is threatening to wedge in at 39, so Black defends against this with 27 and 29. Dia. 1 shows the usual joseki, in which White plays at 1 instead of 26. The sequence to 40 in the figure gives White greater thickness than in Dia. 1, but since he ends in gote, the result seems even. Note that White is waiting to see how the game develops before he chooses between the forcing moves at 'a' and 'b'.

White 30. White 1 in Dia. 2 would also be possible. This would give White the corner profit.



Dia. 1

6: throw-in



Dia. 2





Figure 2 (41 - 66)

Figure 2 (41 - 66)

Black 45 is a questionable move. The combination of 46 and 48, leading to the result to 56, works well with White's thickness on the right. Instead of 45 -

Dia. 3. The best and simplest move is the atari at 1, followed by capturing the white stone. This would reduce the effectiveness of White's thickness to the right.




Dia. 3

White 62 - 66. White is determined to prevent Black from settling his centre group. This fight could be decisive.

Figure 3 (67 - 100)

Black 89, White 90. Both players have overlooked something at the bottom, namely, the tesuji of White 1 in Dia. 4.



Dia. 4




Figure 3 (67 - 100)

Dia. 4. If Black answers at 2, White captures at 3 and since Black cannot give atari at 'a', the corner comes back to life. Consequently, Black would have to play 2 at 3, though this would let White capture his group with 'b'.

The first player to notice this tesuji will obviously have the advantage. Before playing 89, Black should have played 'a' in the figure, forcing White 'b'.

Figure 4 (101 - 128)

White 4. White is the first to wake up. Capturing the black group secures White a fifty-point territory at the bottom, giving him a comfortable lead.

White 14. Playing 1 and 3 in Dia. 5 would be dangerous, as Black 4 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.





Figure 4 (101 - 128)



Dia. 5

Black 19. Black has gained some profit at the top, but not enough to catch up. White keeps his lead safe with 26.

White 28 is a tesuji. However, settling his group with White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c' would be safer.





Figure 5 (129 - 156)

Figure 5 (129 - 156)

When Black plays 35 and 37, his right side territory looks like expanding considerably. Although White has the tesuji of 42 to settle his group, this may not be enough. White no longer has a definite lead.

White 52 is a tesuji. If Black attempts to capture the group with 1 in Dia. 6, White can save himself with 2 to 8.

White 54 is dubious; White 'a' seems to be the correct move. However, Black 55 is too greedy, as White again seizes the initiative with 56. Instead of 55, Black should solidly connect with 'b'; White would have to live with 'c', so Black could then capture the stones on the side cleanly with 'd'.



Dia. 6





Figure 6 (157 - 226)

79: at 74; 86: ko (left of 83)



Dia. 7

Figure 6 (157 - 226)

When White lives on the side with 60 to 64, the game is close again. Black now plays the final losing move with 65 — he must have overlooked White's extension at 66. Instead of 65 —

Dia. 7. Black should connect at 1. White 2 to 6 next are forced, so Black could force with 7, then secure his capture at the top left with 9. This would have thrown the game wide open.

Black fights on valiantly with 73 and 81, but White gets a one-sided ko at the top with 82, so Black's position becomes irretrievably lost.

Black resigns after White 226.

Round One: Kim v. Aguilar

White: Kyung Kim (U.S.A.)

Black: Fernando Aguilar (Argentina)

date: 25th March, 1980

Figure 1 (1 - 44)

Black 3, 5, 7. A good strategy, consistent with his opening move on tengen.

White 18. An excellent point. Perhaps Black should have played 17 at 18.

White 26. A rigorous move which was much





Figure 1 (1 - 44)



Dia. 1

praised by Otake Meijin. He said that it showed that Kim was a very strong player.

Black 29. Too straightforward. Switching to 1 and 3 in Dia. 1 would have been a more interesting strategy here.

Black 35 is close to being the losing move; it just helps the opponent to solidify his position. Instead, Black should play at 'a' or 'b' in the bottom left.

Figure 2 (45 - 88)

Black 45 is a slack move. Black should push up with 1 to 5 in Dia. 2. White is left with the sequence of White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' in the corner, but this is too small to worry about.

White 46, 48. A bad mistake in order, giving Black an excellent atari at 49 which puts him back in the game. White should have played 46 at 48; after Black 52, White 46, Black 47, White



Kyung Kim of the U.S.A. meets Fernando Aguilar of Argentina in the first round.





Figure 2 (45 – 88)



Dia. 2

could extend at 49.

White 58—Black 69. Correct play by both.

White 72, Black 73. Both dubious moves. If Black made a hane at 74 instead of 73, the position would probably be favourable for him. White should have played 72 at 74.

Black 75. When Black cuts here, the sequence to 81 is forced, but then White has a good move at 82, which makes the position difficult for Black. Instead of 75, invading at 'a' would be preferable.

Black 83 is the losing move, as White captures all Black's stones at the top in the sequence to 88. This decides the game — if Black had simply played 83 at 86, he would still have had a chance.

Moves after 88 omitted. Black resigns after White 256.

(Commentary by Aragaki Takeshi 5-dan in 'Let's Go', June 1980)

Finally, here is another Yasunaga game. There is no commentary, but perhaps Yasunaga's bold moyo strategy does not need much explanation.

Round Two: Yasunaga v. Wang

White: Wang Ch'un (China)

Black: Yasunaga Hajime (Japan)

date: 26th March, 1980

Figure 1 (1 – 100)

Figure 2 (101 – 190)

Black wins by 8½ points.




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 190)

Note. The commentaries in this and the previous issue, except for the Kim-Aguilar game, have been taken from a special supplement published by 'Kido', 'The 2nd World Amateur Go Championship'. It is a complete record of all the games played in the tournament, with detailed commentaries on twelve of them. It is available for ¥1,200, including seamount postage.

Special Game Commentary

Abe Yoshiteru 8-dan

3. Ishida Yoshio v. Nieh

White: Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

Black: Nieh Wei-p'ing

komi: 5½; time: 3 hours each

10th June, 1980; played at the Nihon Ki-in




Figure 1 (1 - 41)

Figure 1 (1 - 41)


White 8 is one of Ishida's favourite josekis (for an analysis, see his 'Dictionary of Basic Joseki', Vol. 2, p. 103). Presumably he feels that the result to 14 in the standard joseki shown in Dia. 1 is unfavourable for White. In this game, if White plays 15 at the top next to curb Black's moyo, Black will switch to 'a' in the figure, thus developing rapidly.

Black 17. This time Nieh was presumably dissatisfied with the established joseki in this position, which calls for Black to cut at 1 in Dia. 2. White settles his group with 2 to 6 and there is still some life left in his Δ stones.


White 20. Giving an atari at 1 in Dia. 3 looks tempting, but this falls into a trap. Black would extend at 2, then if White 3, continue with 4 and 6. The white stones are captured — if White 'a', then Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

White 22 is a superb invasion; White's fuseki strategy has been a success.


Black 37. Abe considers this a rather strange move. He would prefer to attack with 1 etc. in




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Dia. 4


Dia. 4.

Figure 2 (42 - 68)

White 42, 44. An important combination. If White simply attaches at 1 in Dia. 5, Black will counterattack with 2 to 6, starting what would



Dia. 5



Dia. 6




Figure 2 (42 - 68)

be a difficult fight for White. Thanks to 42, White is able to advance into the centre with 48.

Black 47 is wrong — connecting at 62 is the only move and would have forestalled White's atari at 58.


Black 51. The more peaceful move of 1 in Dia. 6 also looks possible, though it would let White play 4 at the top. If Black 5, White would go for profit with 6.

When Black peeps at 57, White obstinately refuses to defend at 'a'. If Black plays 59 at 'b', White intends to counter with 'c'; if Black 63 at 'b', White will counter with a double atari at 'd', then hane at 'e'.

Figure 3 (69 - 100)

Black 77. Black cannot connect at 1 in Dia. 7, as White could cut him off with the combination of 2 and 4.

Capturing with 78 nicely settles White's group. Even if Black later plays at ▲ in Dia. 8, White's group is alive as it stands. If Black tries to kill him with 1 etc., White lives with 2 to 8. If next Black 'a', then White 'b' and vice versa.



Dia. 7





Figure 3 (69 - 100)



Dia. 8

6: connects




Figure 4 (101 - 144)

27: connects

Figure 4 (101 - 144)

Black's aggressive play in the last figure leads to a life-and-death struggle at the top when White cuts with 4 and 6. The result is a ko which is worth seventy points. Since Black has no ko threats, he switches to the bottom with 33, hoping to create some threats.





Figure 5 (145 - 210)


51: ko; 53: retakes; 54: ko; 56: atari; 57: ko;
58: at 52; ko (at 70): 76, 79, 82, 85



Dia. 9

Figure 5 (145 - 210)

Black 47. Black has to answer White's ko threat at 46. Since the top is a ko anyway, he might be tempted to finish off the ko at the bottom with 1 in Dia. 9. However, White has a good continuation at 2, capturing the four black stones. If next Black 3, it would be worth-while for




Dia. 10

White to play 4 to defend against Black's threat of a do-or-die ko with 'a'.

Black 63. Nieh perhaps overlooked White 66. Abe thinks that Black 1 in Dia. 10 might be better. White has no choice but to move out with 2 and 4, but Black peeps at 5, then blocks at 7. If White cuts at 'a', Black pulls back at 'b' and White will have a hard time living.

White 106. White cannot connect at 1 in Dia. 11, because Black would win the capturing race with the tesuji of 4.



Dia. 11




Figure 6 (211 - 288)

26: connects (at 19); ko (at 32): 35, 38, 41;
ko (at 30): 61, 64, 67; ko (at 69): 79, 88

Abe's commentary ends at this point. Nieh kept on fighting, setting up ko after ko, but Ishida finished off the game in masterly fashion.

Figure 6 (211 - 288)

Black resigns after White 288.

('Let's Go', August 1980)

18th Judan Title

18th Judan Tournament				
Winners' Section				
Ohira	}	Kudo	}	Kudo
Kudo				
Sonoda	}	Sonoda	}	Kudo
Cho				
Nakamura	}	Nakamura	}	Kudo
Kajiware				
Ishida Y.	}	Ishida	}	Otake
Haruyama				
Sakai T.	}	Otake	}	Otake
Otake				
Rin	}	Honda	}	Otake
Honda K.				
Shimamura	}	Ishida	}	Otake
Ishida A.				
Sakata	}	Hashimoto	}	Otake
Hashimoto S.				
Losers' Section				
Ohira	}	Cho	}	Cho
Cho				
Kajiware	}	Kajiware	}	Cho
Haruyama				
Sakai	}	Rin	}	Rin
Rin				
Shimamura	}	Sakata	}	Kudo
Sakata				
		Sonoda	}	Kudo
		Ishida		
			}	Hashimoto
		Honda		
		Hashimoto	}	Hashimoto

(Note: a list of previous Judan title winners is given on page 25, GW14)

Otake Hideo is having one of his best years for a long time, and he looks like taking Kato's place as the top current title-holder. Otake defeated Kato in the 18th Judan title match, thus taking his total of prizes won to twenty-two, and he has also become the challenger for Cho Chikun's Gosei title. However, he did not have an easy time ousting Kato from the Judan title — in fact, the finish of the match could not have been closer. Below we present the playoff to decide the challenger and the five games of the title match.

18th Judan Tournament Playoff

As the chart shows, this was Otake's second game against Kudo in this tournament. Otake defeated Kudo in the final of the winners' section (given in GW17), but the latter kept his hopes alive by going on to win the parallel losers' section, thus earning the right to meet Otake in a playoff to decide the challenger. Unfortunately for Kudo, he seems to have an Otake-jinx: in recent years

he has lost eight games in a row against Otake, including the winners' section final mentioned above. This must have made him all the more determined to take his revenge.

White: Kudo Norio 9-dan

Black: Otake Hideo, Meijin

komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

date: 13th February, 1980




Figure 1 (1 – 52)

Figure 1 (1 – 52)

The joseki in the bottom left corner also appeared in the fifth game of the Kisei title, played two weeks after this game (see GW19). The result here seems just a little favourable for Black, but it is very hard to see how he can do better. According to Otake, he went over this joseki with Fujisawa Shuko and Kato Masao, but even this high-powered trio could not come to any satisfactory conclusion. Shuko obviously agrees that the joseki is good for Black, for he used it against Rin (who played 28 at 29).

Black 37. If omitted, White will play 37, aiming next at 'a'.

White 38 is a large point, but invading at 'b' is more urgent. Black seizes the opportunity to build up his right side moyo, using the peep at 39 as a decoy. When White counters with 40 and 42, Black makes no attempt to save 39, as his real aim is to jump to 43. He is satisfied with the result to 52, for White's stones here become over-concentrated.





Figure 2 (53 - 77)



Dia. 1


Figure 2 (53 - 77)

White 54. Just for reference, another possibility here is White 1 in Dia. 1. The continuation to 16 is a standard sequence. If White plays 17 at 'a', Black will go for central thickness with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.


White 56. White has been playing very patiently so far, but finally he goes on the offensive. One aim of 56 is to prevent Black from getting good shape by playing at 58.

Black 59 is a probe. The ordinary move of Black 1 in Dia. 2 would be just what White wants. In the continuation to 10, Black gets a weak group susceptible to attack. Note that instead of 8 —


Dia. 3. Escaping with 8 here would be bad, as Black 9 and 11 weaken White's stones on the left side. Black would be happy to sacrifice his four cut-off stones (3, 5 etc.), as in doing so he should be able to expand his right side moyo.




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

White 60 is an aggressive move, but the simple hane at 1 in Dia. 4 would have been better, according to Otake. The moves to 5 would be forced, after which Black would more or less have to play 6. The continuation to 11 could then be expected, but since Black 6 is a bad move, this result would be better for White than that in the game.

The other possibility for White 60 is the hane on top at 1 in Dia. 5. The sequence to 14 would follow, but Kudo did not like this result. Black gets a lot of territory and his ▲ stones still have a lot of aji. Black has the cutting point of 'a', but taking gote to reinforce with White 'b' would be painful.

Black 63. Cutting at 69 would lead to the same result as in Dia. 4.

White 64. If White plays 1 in Dia. 6, Black plays the same sequence as in Dia. 2, with the difference that this time Black can seal White in on the side by playing at 'a' after White 11. White 64 aims at the sequence White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'.



Dia. 6

White 66. If at 69, Black can play 'a' in sente.

After 67, the continuation to 77 is forced. White captures Black 53 with 68, so he has achieved his original objective with 56. However, a magnificent black wall has sprung up out of nothing. Since White has not taken very much territory at the top, Black has profited from the exchange. His contact play at 59 has been a success.




Figure 3 (78 - 100)

Figure 3 (78 - 100)

White 78 is essential. Black's answer at 79 is interesting. Defending his territory with Black 80 looks natural, but White would play 'a' and 'b' in sente, then switch to 'c' on the side, which would make the game quite close.

Black 81, forestalling White 'd' is large, but perhaps Black 'e' is more urgent. The latter move would make pushing through at 'f' and cutting a threat.

White 84 is a determined move. White almost draws even with Black when he splits his position into two up to 88.

Figure 4 (101 - 150)

Black 5 aims at the sequence Black 40, White





Figure 4 (101 - 150)



Dia. 7

Dia. 8

39, Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.

White 12 is forced. If White plays 1 in Dia. 7, Black will counter with 2 to 10, threatening to attack the corner next by blocking at 'a'.

Black 15 is a big move. Playing at 'd' later will make miai of 'e' and 'f'.

White 18. A sacrifice so that White can force with 22 as a preliminary to launching his final assault with 28 and 30.

Black 31. Black defends solidly and the continuation to 46 is forced. White's only gain is that Black has lost the endgame sequence beginning with Black 40 mentioned above. Note that if White later extends at 1 in Dia. 8, Black defends with 2 and 4. Resolving this situation in sente ensures a win for Black, as he is able to switch next to the important point of 47.

Figure 5 (151 - 205)

Black 65. Playing at 67 is worth a little more, but Otake preferred the thickness gained by 65 and 69. He is ahead by about ten points on the board anyway. It is interesting to note that Otake only used two hours forty-seven minutes in this




Figure 5 (151 - 205)

game (Kudo went into byo-yomi on move 172). When Otake is in form, he is the fastest of the top players.

White resigns after Black 205.

18th Judan Title Game One

White: Otake Hideo, Meijin

Black: Kato Masao, Judan, Honinbo, Tengen & Oza

komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

date: 5th March, 1980




Figure 1 (1 – 36)

Figure 1 (1 – 36)

White 6. A leisurely move which was often played by the late Kitani Minoru. Since Black has room to make a two-space extension from 5, this move is not a pincer.

Black 17 is a good move, as the top is more important than the left side.

White 20. The sequence White 22–Black ‘a’–White ‘b’, omitting the 20–21 exchange, is also possible.

White 30. White has to be careful not to let this group come under attack. Black can take away his eye at the top by attaching at ‘c’.

Black 33. Black ‘d’, aiming next at ‘e’ or ‘f’, is also possible.

Figure 2 (37 – 63)

White 44. The first move on which Otake spent any time. White 44 takes sente so that White can switch to 46 next; it also sets up a connection to the top with ‘a’, which may come in useful if Black attacks White’s eye-shape at the top with





Figure 2 (37 – 63)




Dia. 1


Black ‘b’, White ‘c’, Black ‘d’. Otake also considered White 1 in Dia. 1. However, Black would block at 2, which would revive the threat of moving out with the ▲ stone.

When White invaded at 46, the sequence to 53 flowed smoothly, but Otake regretted White 54. Apparently blocking at 1 in Dia. 2 would have been better. Black 2 at 3 would be bad because White would get a squeeze by sacrificing his stones with White ‘a’, Black ‘b’, White ‘c’, Black ‘d’, White ‘e’, Black ‘f’. Alternatively, White could run along the side with ‘g’ instead of ‘e’. When Black plays 2, the sequence to 6 follows and this is better for White than the result in the game as his groups are connected.

White 56 looks natural, but apparently White



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

should make eyes immediately with 60. Kajiware pointed out that White 56 gave Black the chance to switch to 1 in Dia. 3. Black 1 and 3 would cover Black's cutting point at 'a'; next Black could use the placement at 5 to force White to defend with 6 to 10, thus enabling Black to take some additional profit with 11. The result to 13 is better for Black than that in the game.

Black 61, 63. Kato was confident that the thickness gained by these moves put him in the lead.





Figure 3 (64 - 110)

Figure 3 (64 - 110)

White 64 is an interesting probe. White can have no way of knowing it at this stage, but 64 proves to be very useful later on. The general idea is that if Black answers at 65, 64 offers some assistance to the white group on the right, while if Black answers at 109, it will be a help if White later attacks at 'a'.

White 68 is premature and unreasonable. Otake commented that he should have considered attacking with moves such as 'b' or 'c'.

Black 69. A mistake — Kato felt that he was ahead, so he chose the easy answer to 68, but this



Dia. 4


let White take a handsome profit with 70 to 78. Instead, Black should just have pushed through with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4. If next White 4, Black 5 will prove troublesome. Following this diagram would have enabled Black to take advantage of White 68. Incidentally, Fujisawa Hosai suggested a way in which Black could have avoided this problem altogether. Instead of 67, it would have been simpler to force with 1 and 3 in Dia. 5 before defending with 5.

Black 79. Black has to attack severely to recoup his loss in the bottom right.


White 88. Attaching at 'd' might have been simpler. All the same, White will not have much trouble settling his group, as Black has no chance of setting up a double attack. White's forcing move at 64 now promises to be useful.

Black 101. Black cannot permit White to squeeze at 101.

Black 109. Black would like to attack at 1 or 'a' in Dia. 6, but his prospects of success would be too slight to justify the loss incurred. White has a good counter with the probe of 2 and 4, setting up a forcing move at 'b', which helps his eye-shape, and a cut at 'c'.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6




Figure 4 (111 - 151)






Figure 5 (152 - 200)



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Figure 4 (111 - 151)


White 14. If omitted, Black can cut with the sequence in Dia. 7.

White 20. White is virtually alive, in sente moreover, so the game is favourable for him.

White 46 and 48 are bad, according to Otake.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10


White should play 1 and 3 in Dia. 8, aiming at White 'a' next. This combination would be worth a lot of points. The game becomes close when Black swallows up White 30.

Figure 5 (152 - 200)

White 52 and 54 enable White to cut at 56 in sente, but actually White had a much better end-game sequence here. If White gives atari at 1 in Dia. 9, Black cannot answer at 2, because of White 3 and 5. Black would therefore have to follow Dia. 10.

It looked for a moment as if Black had staged an upset, but Otake made up for his slack play with the clever combination of 62 and 64. The professionals following the game expected White 62 at 69, followed by Black 62, and this sequence would actually have left Black with favourable prospects of winning. However, Otake came up with something better.

Black 63. If Black cuts at 1 in Dia. 11, White pulls out a captured stone with 2 to 6.



Dia. 11

Black 65. Black cannot cut at 69. White would counter with White 90, Black 91, White 65, and Black would have to lose two stones on one side or the other.

With 66 and 68, White saves the stones he had lost earlier on. Note that if Black played 67 at 68, he would lose the fight after White 72, Black 'a', White 'b', Black 94.

White 70, defending against Black 'c', is now the biggest move.




Figure 6 (201 - 246)

ko: 31, 34. 46 connects.

Figure 6 (201 - 246)

Otake had a little bit of luck, but on the whole he deserved to win. The highlights of this game were his inspired probe at 64 in Figure 3 and his brilliant kosumi combination with 62 and 64 in Figure 5. Once again he played quite quickly, using just three hours one minute of his time allowance to Kato's five hours forty-seven minutes.

White wins by $4\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Game Two

White: Kato Masao

Black: Otake Hideo

date: 12th March, 1980

Figure 1 (1 - 40)

Black 1, 3. The 'tasuki' pattern. Black 5 next is not often seen — Black usually encloses one of the corners.

Black 7 is also unusual — in fact, this might be the first time that the pattern to 9 has appeared in a professional game. When Black plays 5, he usually continues with the 'mini-Chinese-style'





Figure 1 (1 - 40)

pattern with 7 two lines to the right of 9. However, Otake dislikes stereotyped fusekis.

White 24, 26. These moves were criticised by a number of players, as they help Black to make excellent shape with 25 and 27, while not completely securing the side for White. Attacking from the right side with 26 also contradicts White 20. Instead of 24, Takemiya advocated enclosing the corner with 1 in Dia. 1.




Dia. 1


White 28. White 31—Black 'a'—White 'b' would be safer, but then Black would invade the corner at 'c'. Kato regretted not exchanging White 'd' for Black 'e' before playing 28, however. Once Black has played 31, he will answer White 'd' at 'f', not at 'e'.

White 32. White will come under severe attack if he permits Black to play at 32. All the same, he falls behind by defending here, so perhaps he should have switched to 33 regardless, letting this group take its chances.

White 40. If at 1 in Dia. 2 (next page), Black will play 2; if White defends at 3, Black has a clever invasion at 4.



Dia. 2



Dia. 4





Figure 2 (41 - 100)



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (41 - 100)

Black builds excellent thickness with the sequence to 45, but there is nothing that White can do to stop him. For example, if he tries to counter-attack with 44 at 1 in Dia. 3, Black breaks through into the side with 4 and 6.


White 50. Forestalling Black 'a'.

White 58. White has to let Black attack in the centre, as he would fall behind in territory if he let Black cut at 58.

White 70. If at 100, Black blocks his path with 98.

Black 73 is a mistake, for when White takes the vital point of 76, Black is unable to get an eye at the bottom and so has to waste a move connecting up with 81. Black should have played 73 at 1 in Dia. 4, as this is the vital point for both sides. If White still plays 2, Black can get his eye at the bottom with 3. If instead White plays 2 at 'a', then after Black 'b', White 'c', Black can connect at 2 in sente because of the aji of Black 'd'. Even if White then cuts at 'e', Black gets a second eye with Black 'f', White 'g'. This would be a terrible result for White, so he has no choice about playing 2.

Losing the eye at the bottom means that Black is forced to scramble for safety with 87 etc. and in the process White is able to move into Black's right side territory. White 92 in particular is a very sharp move. If Black tries to intercept with 1 in Dia. 5, he gets into trouble when White counterattacks. Thanks to Black's mistake with 73, White has managed to usurp the lead.



Dia. 5

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

White 10 is a mistake, as White 17 would be bigger. Black 13 makes the game dead even.




Figure 3 (101 - 150)

White 24 is the losing move: White 25 would be bigger. Black would have to answer at 'a', so White could switch to 35 next. When Black plays 33, he is sure of winning.

Figure 4 (151 - 200)

The sequence from 69 seems to involve a small loss for Black, but Otake wanted to 'fill in the blank spaces' and wind up the game.

Figure 5 (201 - 260)

The issue has already been settled and the last hundred moves in this game have no effect on the result. Otake won the game through Kato's mistakes in the early endgame in Figure 3. Ishida




Figure 5 (201 - 260)

Yoshio used to be considered the great endgame expert, but recently Otake has acquired a reputation second to none for his accuracy in the endgame. His skill at assessing the value of thickness early on in the game is also unrivalled.

Black wins by 2½ points.

Game Three

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Kato Masao

date: 1st April, 1980

Figure 1 (1 - 19)

White 8. Otake usually plays the low pincer at




Figure 4 (151 - 200)

100: ko (at 64)




Figure 1 (1 - 19)

18th Judan Tournament Prizemoney

1st prize: ¥4,050,000

2nd prize: ¥810,000

match fee — title-holder: ¥1,425,000

challenger: ¥950,000

prize for winning winners' section: ¥315,000

losers' : ¥109,250

'a', but for this game he switches to the high pincer that Kato is so fond of. The latter decides to base his strategy on rapid development with 9 to 13.




Figure 2 (20 - 72)

Figure 2 (20 - 72)

White 20 is a solid move, forestalling Black 24. Otake also considered invading at 'a', but since Black can press at 'b' at any time, he decided that it would be wiser not to start a fight at the top. Securing White's group at the top right makes it easy to keep in check Black's moyo potential at the bottom.


White 28. White 'c', letting Black attack at 66, would be too heavy.

White 32. White 66 would be more usual.

Black 33. A probe which also aims at covering up Black's weak point at 57.

White 34. Too thin — White should reinforce at 'd', according to Otake.

Black 41. Otake commented that this was an uncharacteristically passive move for Kato. He expected him to intercept with 1 in Dia. 1. White can live with 2 to 8, but when Black defends at 9, he has to look after his group at the top with 10 to 16. This would give Black a chance to launch a



Dia. 1

severe attack at 17.

White 46 is a mistake, according to Otake. Instead, he should reinforce for the fight in the centre with 'e'. The combination of the atari at 49 and the capping move at 51 works superbly for Black. If he becomes thick in the centre, he can aim at moving out at 'f' at the top.

White 52. The position is difficult for White. If he moves out to the left, he helps Black to solidify his centre, but if he goes to the right, he helps Black to enclose territory.

Black 59 is an overplay, for if White lives, this stone will become meaningless. Kato commented that he should have played 59 at 71, for the latter move would be useful whatever happens.

Black 63. The only move — if White got the chance to give atari at 63, he would live easily with 66 and 68, followed by White 'g'.

Black 65. Black has to give way with 65 in order to prevent 59 from becoming a bad move. If he played at 1 in Dia. 2, White would connect underneath with 2 and 4, after which White 8 would be sente whatever Black played to prevent White from getting an eye in the corner. If White 8 is sente, White can easily pick up a second eye


Otake v. Kato

Prior to the Judan title match, Otake and Kato had played each other 26 times, with Otake winning 14 games and Kato 12. They have met in three previous title matches.

2nd All-Japan Number One Position (1971): Otake (defender) defeated Kato 2-0.

1st Gosei title (1976): Kato defeated Otake 3-2, thus winning his first title.

3rd Gosei title (1978): Otake (challenger) defeated Kato 3-1.



Dia. 2

Dia. 3

with 10 and 12. This result would mean a lost game for Black.

After 66 to 70, White looks like having little trouble securing life. He even has time to start attacking with 72 on the left.

Figure 3 (73 – 110)

Black 73. Kato regretted this move. If Black wants to cut, he must do so with 1 and 3 in Dia. 3. If White 'a', Black attaches at 'b' and




Figure 3 (73 – 110)


97: at 89

should do better than he does in the game. Black 73 and 75 are adequate to prevent White from linking up his groups, but White is satisfied with poking his head out in sente with 76 to 80, as this helps to mitigate the threat of Black 'a'.


Black 85. Defending against both 90 and 92.

Black 93 is correct. If Black cuts with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4, White 4 makes miai of a second eye at 5 and the double atari at 6.


White 100 is a tesuji, but Otake regretted that he did not exchange White 1 for Black 2 in Dia. 5 before attaching at 3. If Black 4, White would push through with 5 to 9, thus attacking Black's



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

stones on the right a little while escaping. If Black intercepted at 6 instead of 4, White would counter with White 4, Black 'a', White 'b' and could not be stopped because of the threat of White 'c'.

Black 101. Black cannot cut at 1 in Dia. 6, as White counters with 2 to 6, making miai of a second eye at 'a' and capturing Black's key stones with 'b'.

Black 105. Black gives up hope of capturing the large white group. However, White's failure to make the White 104 – Black 'b' exchange before playing 100 means that White falls one move behind. With that exchange made, it would have been his turn to capture the ko at 'c' after Black 104. Otake considered this slip a factor in his eventual defeat.

White 106, 108. The worse order of moves – Otake commented that at this point he started playing crazy moves. White should simply push at 108, omitting 106. If he then defused Black's time bomb by pressing at 'd', White would have a safe

lead. In any case, once having played 106, White should continue with White 109, Black 'e', White 'd'.




Figure 4 (111 - 155)
31: ko (below 28)




Figure 4 (111 - 155)

Black 11 and 13 are severe: the balance of power on the left side is reversed and White has to scurry for safety with 14. He then reinforces with 16 to make sure that Black does not get a double attack going. Note that although Black 15 looks thin, White cannot cut. If he tries, with 1 in Dia. 7, Black has a nice counter prepared with 2 to 10.

White 20. White is tired of being forced continually on the defensive, so he attempts to exploit Black's thinness in this area by attacking with 20. Complications develop when Black seals White in with 25 instead of rescuing his four stones. White would have been better advised to play 22 at 25, letting Black play 22. If he secured this group, White could switch to the left side, attacking Black with the sequence shown in Dia. 8. In the opinion of Ishida Yoshio, who acted as referee for this

game, playing this way would have kept White in the lead.



Otake was too concerned with attacking Black's bottom right group and this is in some danger. For example, if Black omitted 27, White could kill him with White 'a', Black 'b', White 27. However, when Black connects at 27, White has to fight for life with the ko at 28 (he disdains making a second eye with 'c' as too passive).

Black 29. If at 'c', White will play 48. Rather than trying to kill White, Black just wants him to take gote with 'c'.

White 30. Even if omitted, Black cannot kill the corner. If he jumps in at 1 in Dia. 9, White 4 is the key point. After White 6, White is alive, as Black 7 and 9 do nothing. In view of this, it would probably have been a good idea for White to ignore Black 29 in order to connect at 1 in Dia. 10.

Dia. 10. If Black 2, White moves out with 3. Later he might be able to launch a counterattack against the black group. Since White can play White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' in sente at any time, Black only has one eye on the side.

White 32. An overplay which Otake called the losing move. Starting another fight at the top



Dia. 11

when the group below is still unsettled is reckless in the extreme. White only succeeds in creating a heavy group, while Black builds a useful wall in the centre. Even White's group on the left side is endangered.

White 40. Perhaps White should have changed horses in midstream, playing 1 etc. in Dia. 11 in order to sacrifice the stones at the top and taking Black's left side stones in return. This would be better than the sequence White played in the game, but even so the position would not be favourable for him. Black might make an all-out effort to capture his group at the bottom with the sequence Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f', Black 'g', thus bypassing the ko. Otake commented that whatever he did, he had already lost the lead at this stage.

With 41 and 43, Black forces White to connect underneath at the top, then with 47 he prepares to attack White's left side group. White seizes the opportunity to force with 48, thus ensuring that he has at least a ko, but Black can get any number of ko threats on the left.





Figure 5 (156 - 207)
ko (at 81): 84, 87, 90; ko (at 86): 91, 94;
95: ko (at 81)

Figure 5 (156 - 207)

Black 61 and 63 are a calm response to White's crosscut. In desperation, White enlarges the battle front with 66 to 70, but the situation rapidly moves beyond his control.

White 106 sets the scene for resignation. It makes miai of 'a' and 'b', but Black 107 defends



Dia. 12

against both these threats. If next White 'c', then Black captures two stones with 'b' and White cannot cut at 'a', as Black gets a ladder. White 1 etc. in Dia. 12 are also easily dealt with by Black. Note that if White plays 3 at 7, Black counters with 'a'.

When Black's attack on White's group at the bottom misfired early on, this game looked like a sure win for White. However, it is to Kato's credit that he dominated the fierce fighting in the latter part of the game.

White resigns after Black 207.

Time taken. White: 2 hours 35 minutes

Black: 5 hours 7 minutes

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Game Four

White: Kato Masao

Black: Otake Hideo

date: 9th April, 1980




Figure 1 (1 - 41)

Figure 1 (1 - 41)


Black 5. A corner enclosure at the top right would be more solid, but Otake promised before this series began that he would vary his fuseki in each game. For the same reason, he played Black 7 next, although he prefers the high move at 'a'.

Black 13. Otake also considered the joseki shown in Dia. 1.

Black 15. A move invented by Takagi 8-dan which aims at maintaining balance, as Black's moves so far have all been on the third line.

Black 17. Black 22 would be more usual, as the aim of Black 15 is to play 39 later on.

White 22 is after all big. Black goes on the offensive with 23 and 25. White 26 in reply is dubious; White should make a shoulder-hit at 32, enabling him to move out into the centre a step



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

ahead of Black. White takes profit with 26 and 28, but at the cost of giving Black the initiative in the centre. This perhaps makes the position slightly difficult for White.

Black 41 makes a move at 'b' or 'c' very big.





Figure 2 (42 - 82)

ko (at 65): 73, 76, 79



Dia. 3

Dia. 4

15: connects

Figure 2 (42 - 82)


Black 43. If at 1 in Dia. 2, White has a strong move at 2. Black would be in trouble after White 6. However, Otake commented that 43 was a little heavy and that correct shape here would be Black 'a'. An alternative is Black 1 in Dia. 3. If White 2, Black plays 3 and White cannot go in any further. If he does, with 4, Black counters with 5 to 11, whereupon White will have to lose something on the left or the right.

White 46 is surprising; White is obviously worried that Black might set up a large moyo by playing around 46. However, Otake commented that he would have found it more disagreeable if White had followed Dia. 4.


Dia. 4. If White 1 and 3, Black can capture these four stones by cutting with 4 to 8, but then White has a good move at 9. Since White is aiming at White 'a', Black has to come back and defend at 16, even though this lets White push through with 17 and 19.

Black is grateful for the chance to defend with 47 and 49. This secures him almost thirty points of territory and he can still aim at attacking the white group.

Black 57 is necessary. If Black extended at 1 in *Dia. 5*, White could set up a ko with 2 to 6. Note that if White started this ko with 56, Black would be able to attack the other white group with Black 56, White 'b', Black 'c' in the figure, but once White has played 56, he can answer Black 'a' in *Dia. 5* with 'b'. The sequence to 59 is therefore forced.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

White 60 makes miai of extensions along the bottom and the left side. Since Black is strong in the centre, he plunges in immediately with 63.

Black 67. Black 1 in *Dia. 6* is a standard technique for settling a group, but here Black is dissatisfied with the result to 9, for his group is balanced precariously without a base or proper eye-shape. Trying to settle the group with a ko is therefore natural.

Black 81. Otake felt that resolving the ko was appropriate. The positions are now reversed, with White having superior thickness in the centre, but Black taking the lead in territory.

Figure 3 (83 – 104)

White 84. Otake criticised 84 as the kind of 'thin move one doesn't expect from Kato'. He felt that White should prevent Black from connecting by playing 1 and 3 in *Dia. 7*. Instead of 2 –

Dia. 8. If Black plays 2 here, then White counters with 3 etc. Black can capture the two stones in the corner, but he loses his centre group.

Black 87. Black is connected – White cannot cut at 'a' because of the combination of Black







Figure 3 (83 – 104)



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

'b', 'c' and 'd'. Now that his group at the top is safe, Black can start fighting in the centre with 89 and 91.

White 92. If omitted, Black will strike with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 9*.

Having secured allies in the centre, Black now starts moving out at the bottom with 93. Since he is ahead in territory, he is trying to wind up the game. However, Black 99 is an overplay, as it lets White destroy Black's shape with 100 and 102. Black should have played the commonsense move of 100 instead of 99.




Figure 4 (105 - 155)

Figure 4 (105 - 155)

Black 5, 7. Black is safe for the time being, but the exchange of 5 for 6 helps White. Black's position is thin again.

White 8 is a large move. White is also aiming at cutting at 'a', so Black thinks it just as well to help his eye-shape with 13.


Black 25. Black should play at 40 in the bottom left corner, for not only is this the biggest move, it is also the key point for eye-shape for the opposing groups here. Playing at 40 would make miai of 25 and 43.

Black 29 is the losing move. The best answer to White's challenge at 28 is 1 in Dia. 10. If White 2, Black plays 3 to 7; if later White 'a', Black gives way with 'b' and White can go no further. White's forcing moves of 30 and 32 make a big difference both in territory and in central influence.


Actually at this stage of the game Otake had gone wrong in his assessment of the position and he mistakenly thought that he could afford to compromise on the left side. Behind this misjudgement lay a misreading at the bottom. Otake thought that he would not have to answer White 36, but he was overlooking the sequence in Dia. 11, which kills Black.

Black 37. If at 38, White forces with 'b', Black 39, White 'c'. This in itself would ensure life for White's bottom group, so he would be able to switch to the last large endgame point at 43.


While Black is linking up with 37 and 39, White takes profit with 38 and 40, then lives neatly



Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

with 42.

Dia. 12. Attempting to kill White with 1 etc. would be reckless. In the sequence to 12, the tables are turned on Black.

White 44. If Black answers at 'd', White forces on both sides with White 45, Black 'e', White 'f'. Black obstinately resists with 45 and 47, but this loses points, as White 'g' is now clearly sente.





Figure 5 (156 - 220)

Figure 5 (156 - 220)

Black 59. Otake regretted not making the Black 'a' - White 'b' exchange, as this would have eased



Dia. 13

the pressure on his centre top group after White cut at 60. For example, Black would be able to connect at 1 in Dia. 13 instead of 71. If White tried to kill the group with 2 etc., Black 7 and 9 would enable Black to capture some of the surrounding stones, thanks to the $\triangle$ $\blacktriangle$ exchange.

The sente profit White takes up to 76 is the final nail in Black's coffin. Normally Otake would resign without wasting any more time, but he put his pride aside and battled on for another forty moves or so, not because he had any hope of getting back into the game but just to satisfy critics who complain that he is too quick to resign. By 120, however, it was painfully clear that the game was close on the board, so Otake must have felt that by then he had done his duty.

The series was now tied, with Kato having made an excellent recovery from his bad start. After surviving two kadobans, he seemed to have excellent prospects of achieving his target of holding the Judan title for a record successive five terms.

Black resigns after White 220.

Time taken. White: 5 hours 59 minutes

Black: 4 hours 46 minutes

Game Five

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Kato Masao

date: 14th April, 1980

Figure 1 (1 – 33)

White 16. The joseki in Dia. 1 has gone out of fashion, as Black gets nice thickness by poking his head through with 2 and 4.

White 18. If at 'a', Black gets good shape with 'b'.

White 28. Either this move or 'c' for Black is the key post-joseki move at the top. Otake commented that White gets an ideal fuseki development in the result to 28, so perhaps Black should






Figure 1 (1 – 33)




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

not have invaded at 19. Fujisawa Shuko advocated attaching at 2 in Dia. 2 instead. After the moves to 5 (which could also be at 'a'), White 'b' is no longer such a big move.

Black 31. Black would like to push up with 1 and 3 in Dia. 3, but White would take sente and switch to 'd' in the figure. If Black then cut at 'a' in the diagram, White would make shape with 'b'; if next Black 'c', White easily copes with 'd'.



Dia. 3






Figure 2 (34 - 52)



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Figure 2 (34 - 52)


White 34, 36. A striking example of Otake's originality. These moves clearly give up points on the right side, but Otake felt that they maintained overall balance, considering White's excellent position on the left side.

Black 35 is a strong move. If White answers at 1 in Dia. 4, he will be in trouble when Black continues with 2 and 4. White 3 and 5 in Dia. 5 are no improvement.


The consensus among professionals was that Black had a favourable position after 37, but in fact the game was close throughout, which suggests that Otake was not astray in his judgement. Sakata 9-dan, who joined in the post-game session with the players, commented: 'I could never play like this. If the game is still close after 34 and 36, I have to change my way of thinking about go.'



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

9: at 1; 11: below 7

White 38. There are a number of ways to attack Black. Fujisawa Shuko, for example, advocated the combination of 1 and 3 in Dia. 6 and gave the continuation to 13 (5 could also be at 'a').

White 44. Otake also considered attaching at 1 in Dia. 7, which would lead to a ko up to 7. Since Black does not have enough ko threats to cut at 'a', Kato said that he would have switched to 8. The result to 12 is then likely and while White gets a lot of territory, this might be acceptable for Black.

Black 45. Fujisawa Hosai suggested Black 1 in Dia. 8, a move easy to overlook since Black has already made one diagonal move at Δ . The result to 11 would be good for Black. If next White 'a', then Black can play 'b'; if instead White 'c', then Black 'a'.

White 50. Otake regretted giving atari — he should simply have extended at 'a'.





Figure 3 (53 - 100)

Figure 3 (53 - 100)

Black 53 is a tesuji. If White plays 1 in Dia. 9, 2 to 6 work perfectly for Black. The result to 59 in the figure is similar to this, but White has avoided making the bad exchange of White 1 - Black 8 in the diagram.



Dia. 9

White 60 is the vital point. If White played 'a' instead, Black would press at 60.

Black 61, 63. When Black escapes with his centre stones after securing his large group, the position looks reasonable for him. Continuing the attack directly with 67 does not look favourable, so White attacks from a distance with 64 and 66. Black plays 67 just to be on the safe side.

White 84 forestalls Black 'b'. If White keeps attacking the centre group instead, a few more moves would make it definitely alive. White prefers to keep the situation fluid. The game seems favourable for Black, but White has made some gains from his attack, such as solidifying his left side territory and picking up some points in the right centre and at the bottom, so he is still well





Figure 4 (101 - 131)



Dia. 10

in the game. White 94 shows that White thinks he can match Black territorially.


Figure 4 (101 - 131)

White 4. An early start to the endgame.

White 6 is a clever move. If White simply played at 28, Black would switch elsewhere after Black 7, White 8.

Black 7. Black cannot play at 1 in Dia. 10, as he loses the fight.

Black 19 is the losing move. Kato seems to have realised that it was wrong after he played it, for he took a long time to play 21, although he had no choice about the latter move after 19. The correct move for 19 is Black 1 in Dia. 11. Black 5 is a




Dia. 11

good follow-up, leading to the sequence to 13. White is in trouble after 13 — if White 'a', Black attacks at 'b'. Black 1 in this diagram would have kept Black in the lead, whereas with 19 in the figure the game becomes dead even.


White 22 gives White thickness here and also makes it difficult for Black to play the hane of 1 in Dia. 12. The reason is that White will answer with 2 and 4, whereupon both sides will switch elsewhere. However —

Dia. 13. Later on White can pick up three stones with the sequence to 9.


Although it was obvious that it was now a neck-and-neck race, none of the numerous professionals following the game predicted that Black would lose by half a point. Only Sakata Eio, with a flash of intuition, commented that Black 19 looked like turning out to be the losing move.




Dia. 12




Dia. 13





Dia. 14
11: connects



Dia. 15 *10: connects*

White 58 is a nice thick move, but it startled Otake's fellow professionals, as 59 looks bigger. However, 58 was actually a declaration of victory by Otake: it makes miai of White 'b' and White 60 and Otake had read out that this gave him a win by half or one and a half points. He had also worked out that 58 was the surest way of winning.

Black 59. Even if Black switches to 1 in Dia. 15, he still loses by half a point, according to Ohira 9-dan, the referee, who gave the continuation to 22 here.

Figure 6 (171 – 223)

Black 87. After the game Otake suggested that Black 88 might have been better, but further investigation showed that it made no difference to the result.

When the game finally ended at 223, it turned




Figure 6 (171 – 223)
115: retakes above 114

out that both players had miscalculated the result. Otake thought that he was one and a half points ahead, while Kato, who had been in byo-yomi since 127 in Figure 4, apparently thought that he was the one with the half point lead. This miscounting aside, the endgame was of a very high standard – Otake's play was faultless, while Kato made just that one small but costly slip with 119 in Figure 4.

Throughout the series, Otake's endgame play made the vital difference, just as it did in last year's Meijin title match. Once again, he showed that he might be the best endgame player around, not to mention other departments of the game.


White wins by ½ point.

Time taken. White: 5 hours 7 minutes

Black: 5 hours 57 minutes


Basic Fighting Techniques

Miyazawa Goro




Problem One: Black to play

So far Black only has one eye. How can he pick up a second one? (6-kyu)



Problem Two: Black to play

There is a defect in White's shape which Black can exploit to rescue his six trapped stones. (5-kyu)



Problem Three: Black to play

White's group is not as safe as it looks. There is a clever way for Black to attack it. (5-kyu)



Pattern 7: The Contact Play

The essence of the contact play (tsuke) is the element of surprise. The aim is to strike at the opponent's weak point, to find the defect in his shape, to exploit his blind-spots. This tesuji is particularly useful

Miyazawa 6-dan when one's stones are coming under severe pressure from an enemy attack. The virtue of the contact play is that it compels a response and gives the opponent plenty of scope to go wrong.






Illustration One: White to play

If White does not want to let Black take all the territory at the top left, he can make good use of his solitary captured stone.



Dia. 1: the tesuji




Dia. 2: success

Dia. 1. Black's two stones in the middle are short of liberties, but the trick is to attack them indirectly with White 1.


Dia. 2. If Black plays safe with 2, White 3 makes a large reduction in his territory. If Black plays 2 at 'a', White pulls out his stone with

White 2 and Black has no answer.

Dia. 3. Black is unable to resist. Black 2 here is useless as White captures two stones with 3.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4: failure

Dia. 4. White 1 misses the vital point: White can do nothing after Black 2. White 1 at 'a' also fails when Black counters at 'b'.




Problem One

If Black is to live, he has to do something spectacular with the single white stone on the second line.




Dia. 1: failure

Dia. 1. Bluntly pushing through at 1 is unworthy of Black. White of course saves his stone with 2 and 4 and the squeeze with 3 and 5 does not give Black enough space for a second eye. Black 1 at 2 also fails.



Dia. 2: the tesuji



Dia. 3: success

Dia. 2. The clamp at 2 may be a blind spot. Attacking these two stones opens up possibilities for Black.

Dia. 3. Black forces White to connect at 2, then lives with 3; if next White 'a', Black 'b' and vice versa. White 2 at 'a' also fails.






Illustration Two: White to play

This pattern frequently occurs in play and involves a famous tesuji. Black is threatening to capture one stone on the side or three stones at the top. How can White defend against both these threats simultaneously?



Dia. 1: the problem




Dia. 2: the solution


Dia. 1. The problem is that if White hanes at 1, Black captures a stone with 2; if instead White plays 1 at 'a', Black captures the stones at the top with 'b'.

Dia. 2. The tesuji of White 1 comes up so often knowledge of it is essential.

Dia. 3. If Black 2, White forces with 3, then leads out his stones on the right with 5 and 7. The sequence to 8 is correct for both. Note that




Dia. 3



Dia. 4: too greedy


if Black omits 8, White kills him by playing there himself.

Dia. 4. Trying to attack the corner with 1 here instead of 5 in Dia. 3 is unreasonable. After Black 4, White cannot give atari, so he loses the fight.



Dia. 5


Dia. 5. The simplest way, for Black to play is to go for outward influence with 2 to 6. White is satisfied with his corner profit.



Problem Two: Black to play


Black has to find a way to rescue his six isolated stones.

Dia. 1. White has no trouble dealing with the peep at 1. Playing 1 at 'a' also fails when White answers at 'b'.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2. Black 1 is the vital point. After Black 3, White's position is in tatters – there is nothing he can do.




Dia. 2: the vital point




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. If White connects at 1, Black not only secures a base at the top but also captures some enemy stones.

Dia. 4. If White counters with 2 and 4, Black captures with 5 and 7, then —




Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Dia. 5. If White 8 and 10, Black secures one eye with 11 and 13, then makes sure of a second by capturing two stones with 15.

Note that Black 7 at 'a' in Dia. 4 would be wrong, because after White 'b', Black 'a', White would connect at 7.




Problem Three: Black to play


White might think that his stones here are safe, but Black has move to shock him out of his complacency.

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the vital point for attack. If White 2, Black continues with 3. If next White 'a', then Black 'b' and White has lost his base. This would be a great success for Black.

Black 1 at 'c' is also possible but not quite as effective as Black 1. White would counter with White 1, Black 'b', White 3, Black 'd'.




Dia. 1: the tesuji



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. If White hanes underneath at 2, sacrificing a stone with 3 is the key point of this pattern. In the sequence to 9, Black seals White in on the side, forcing him to live on a small scale. This is clearly a success for Black.



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Giving atari at 1 instead of 4 in Dia. 2 is not advisable for White. Capturing a stone with 4 is good enough for Black, as White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' would be unreasonable, since Black can just cut at 'd'. White therefore would have to play at 'd' after Black 4, whereupon Black would capture at 'b'. Gouging out White's position like this would be another success for Black.

(*'Gekkan Go'*, July 1978)

Strange Fusekis - Past and Present

Akagi's Centre Enclosure




Figure 1 (1 – 12)

Black: Akagi Kazuo 8-dan

White: Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

*21st Kansai Ki-in Number One Position
tournament (1977) (komi 5½)*

Opening moves on the tengen (centre point) have appeared in a number of famous games, ancient and modern, but Black's strategy in Figure 1 is much more unusual. Akagi Kazuo 8-dan experimented with the 1–3 combination, which could be called a tengen-jimari or 'centre enclosure', in a game against Miyamoto Naoki in 1977.

This was Akagi's third trial of the tengen-Jimari (previously he had won one game with it and lost one), but the opening to 9 was the same in all three games. In the first White played 10 at 'a', giving Black a good pincer at 'b'; in the second White played 10 at 'c', giving Black a superb move at 'd'. Miyamoto played 10 and 12 to try to counter Black's central influence.

Figure 2. White 16 is a clever move. The usual joseki of White 20–Black 21–White 22–Black 23–White 'a'–Black 24 would help Black.

Black 17. If at 20, White will be glad to connect at 17.

In the result to 26, White goes a long way towards negating Black's central influence at the bottom. The next problem is the top.

The strategy of both sides in the fighting at the top is keyed to Black's centre enclosure. To give an example, White 38 is essential, because if




Figure 2 (13 – 50)

25: connects




Figure 3 (51 – 100)

White follows the usual joseki by cutting at 'b', Black will play 38, thus driving White towards his strong position in the centre.

Figure 3. White 66 prevents Black 'a', but gives Black a good move at 67, threatening the groups above and below.

Black 93 aims at 'b'.

With all his groups secured by 100, White has a slight edge, but Black has demonstrated that the tengen-jimari is a valid strategy.

Moves 101 – 333 omitted. White wins by 3½ points.

From Amateur to Professional

Tomita Tadao 7-dan

In January 1979 the insei league was won in surprise fashion by Tei Meiko, a youngster from Tainan, Taiwan who had been in Japan only eight months. His victory promoted him to professional shodan, and nine months later, at the age of sixteen, he made 2-dan. We shall watch his development in three games, the first being a quick examination game I played him when I visited Taiwan in 1977. The game was shortened, because it was the morning of my departure and there was not enough time to finish.

What mattered in this game was not whether Black played badly or well, but his sense of tesuji and his courage facing a stronger opponent. These are the first qualities a professional needs, and they are innate; they cannot be taught. If you have them, and are not too proud to study and learn, your future is assured.

Game 1

Black: Tei

White: Tomita

Handicap: three stones

December 2, 1977, in Taipei





Figure 1 (1 - 34)

Figure 1 (1 - 34)


Black's opening was completely thoughtless: nearly all his moves were blatant overplays. To begin with, there was Black 6.



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 and 3 would have been much simpler.


Then there was Black 8.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. There was no reason for Black not to follow the usual sequence shown here. Apparently such tame ideas did not occur to this fourteen-year-old firebrand.


Through 24 Black had been playing at lightning speed, but after White 25 he suddenly stopped and began to think.



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Black would like to play the double hane at 1, answering White 2 with 3, 5, and 7 and winning the resulting capturing race.

Dia. 4. But White will connect at 2. If Black captures with 3, White plays 4 and 6. Next one can foresee a squeeze followed by a ladder at 'a' — Black collapses. If Black plays 3 at 5,



Dia. 4

he loses the capturing race by one move (White 'b').

So Black had to do an about-face at 26. White's pon-nuki at 29 signified the failure of Black's opening.

But this White 29 was itself a mistake: White should first have given atari at 30, forcing Black 'a'. Black 30 was ideal, and with 34 Black was back on the attack.





Figure 2 (34 - 63)

Figure 2 (34 - 63)

Tei: 'Black 34 is where I'd play today, but cutting at 40 overdid it. Black 44, White 42, Black 59 looks better.'

Perhaps so, but the cut at 40 still put White




Dia. 5

8: connects

in an uncomfortable position. At 41 -

Dia. 5. I wanted to connect at 1, but could not see how to deal with Black's extension at 2. White 3 to 7 may be an attractive squeeze, but then -



Dia. 6

Dia. 6. If White continues by extending to 1, Black wedges at 2 and wins the capturing race by one move. White must therefore play 1 at 'a', upon which Black will seize the controlling point at 1. This is why I gave atari at 41, but White 41 violated tesuji, and I was far from pleased with it.

Tei: 'Black 52 overdid it again. I should have defended at 54.'

After White 63 I had to leave for the airport, so the game ended here.

Tei: 'Thank goodness.'*

Even in this abbreviated game, however, I had been impressed by my opponent's fearlessness, and by the way he stopped and read accurately after White 25. I came away with high hopes for him.

Game suspended at White 63.

On Mondays a group of professionals and insei, led by Ko Mosi whom we met in the last article, gathers at my house for practice and study. Top-ranking amateurs sometimes join the group, which usually numbers about ten people in all.

Various amateur-professional differences can be observed at these meetings, one being the difference in post-mortem time. If a game has lasted three hours, another three hours will be spent studying it. On some days no games are played at all; the whole time is devoted to going over games of the day before. Compare this with amateur practice, in which the loser generally asks for an immediate rematch.

There is also the speed with which variations

* Translator's note: Black 54, 56, and probably the entire lower left are captured.

are explored. The amateurs, top-rank though they be, are rarely able to get a word in edgewise. Some of the insei also have difficulty following the discussion; they may be the ones who are not going to make the grade.

The next game we shall see was played at one of these Monday sessions. Tei had been in Japan only a couple of months, but he had already begun to absorb knowledge from the other members of the group, and his rigid style had begun to broaden. We were now alternating between a two- and three-stone handicap. Since the two-stone handicap was accompanied by a $5\frac{1}{2}$ -point komi, White could not help taking risks, which it was Black's job to capitalize on.

Game 2

Black: Tei

White: Tomita

Handicap: two stones plus $5\frac{1}{2}$ komi

July 24, 1978




Figure 1 (1 - 58)
28 connects

Figure 1 (1 - 58)

Tei: 'I should have played 6 at 'a'.'


If then White 7 and 9?

Tei: 'I'd play 10 at 'b'.'


White might accordingly try the sequence in Dia. 7, but let's get off this tangent.

Black 14 and 16 were not joseki moves, but they were an interesting idea, stressing the left side. Black 14 at 'c' is also playable.


White 17 could have been at 24, and Black 18 could have been a one-space jump to 19.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Tei: 'I didn't think of that, but it looks good. If White pushes through and cuts, Black captures the cutting stone.'

That gives either Dia. 8 or Dia. 9, both results being favorable for Black. In Dia. 8, if White plays 8 at 'a', Black should force with 9 at 'b'.

In the actual game, White was satisfied to gain sente in the exchange through 30 and shift to the invasion at 31.

Tei: 'Black 34 should have been 38. It's a — what do you call it?'

He wants to say that Black 34 is a move that seems severe, but actually helps White to defend, but his command of Japanese is not equal to the task.

Tei: 'Black 58 was the wrong direction. It should have been the knight's move at 'd'.'

Black 'd' would have reinforced the isolated stones at 46 and 48, defended indirectly against white moves around 58, and developed in the direction of future potential on the right side.

Figure 2 (59 - 130)

Black 66 was lukewarm. To be forced to capture two stones with 70 to 74 while White played 69 in sente was a setback for Black.

Dia. 10. He should have answered White 1 by capturing one stone with 2 and 4. After 6, note that Black has a good next move at 'a', attacking White's eye shape and preventing his linking through to the left.

White 75 would ordinarily be played at 89, but I decided that the group containing 61 had served its purpose, and that the time had come





Figure 2 (59 - 130)



Dia. 10

to try to take the lead by attacking the three black stones to the right. A large exchange ensued, and although White lost more stones, they were already fastened against a strong black wall, while the three stones that Black gave up contained considerable potential that died with them. The exchange may have been even in purely territorial terms, but White had the advantage.

White 95, however, was a careless mistake. Capturing Black 82 with 'a' was of course correct. I was too much concerned about establishing a cut at the left of 94. The difference between White's capturing 82 and Black's capturing 79 was enormous. Considering the komi, Black was clearly ahead, despite White 97 and 99.


White 107 lost the game. I should have made an angle play at 108. If Black cut at 107, I could nip off part of his group with 'b-c-d', and losing the corner would not be so serious because Black would actually have to capture it. If Black answered White 108 at 'd', White could connect

at 107, having gained a valuable forcing exchange.

Tei: 'Then I should have played 106 at 108. I could play 106 anytime later.'

White 119 should have been 120, but that would not have won the game. By letting Black have the upper side, I planned to set up White 123 to 127 and with luck counter-attack on the right side. Black cooperated at 130.

Dia. 11. If he had turned at 1, jumped to 3, and blocked at 5, he would have been a safe ten points in the lead. His hane at 130 led to a final round of confusion before the game ended.



Dia. 11




Figure 3 (131 - 184)

76: ko at 70

Figure 3 (131 - 184)

A large ko fight arose on the right side, but White lacked a decent ko threat. The ko shifted to the lower side, and White still had no good ko threat. The small amount gained in the top left was nowhere near adequate.

White resigns at Black 184.

I wrote this manuscript at my desk one day late last year. Tei spent that whole day in the house, from before 9:00 a.m. until after 7:00 p.m., with only short breaks for meals, silently playing through game records. Talent plus effort — or perhaps talent lies in the ability to make that kind of effort.

The next game was Tei's latest at the time of writing.

Game 3

White: Tei 2-dan

Black: Anonymous 2-dan

komi: 5½

December 12, 1979. Kisei tournament




Figure 1 (1 - 60)

32: connects

Figure 1 (1 - 60)

A new joseki variation appeared in the bottom right corner — more study material for these young professionals.

Tei: 'Black should have played 19 at 20. White should perhaps have played 28 at 29, but he still did well on the exchange through 30.'

No sooner had White taken the lead, however, than he plunged into difficulties with 34, an overplay which should have been at 35.

Figure 2 (61 - 128)

Black 49 in the last figure and 67 in this were mistakes. Tei won, but his game obviously has a long way to go.

Black resigns at White 128.




Figure 2 (61 - 128)

119: connects

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'* March 1980. Translated by James Davies)


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
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
Black to play




76




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


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


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
Vulgar style




Black 1 leaves Black with a weak point at 'a'.




Black 1 is a good defensive move, but...



If Black 1, White plays 2, forcing Black into bad shape. Likewise, if Black 2, then White 1.




Black 1 and 3 make Black heavy.




If Black 1, White saves his stones with 2 and vice versa. What is the most profitable way for Black to play here?


Correct Style




The more reserved move of 1 is correct. White 'a' is no longer a threat.




In this case Black 1 is better.




The placement of Black 1 is a sharp move. If White cuts at 'a', then Black 'b'.




Cutting at 1 is the key to settling Black's group lightly.




Cutting at 1 is the solution. If White 'a', Black of course captures the three stones with 'b'.




This also gives Black the endgame sequence of Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f'.




White will probably defend at 2, so Black has prevented White 'a' in sente. If White later attacks at 'a', Black answers with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.



If White 2, then Black 3, keeping sente. If White plays 2 at 4, Black forces with 'a'.



If White 2, Black forces with 3 and 5, then fixes up his shape with 7.




White will save his stones with 2, whereupon Black gets a nice corner territory with 3. This is the correct variation.

The Great Joseki Debate

Honda Kunihisa 9-dan

How to choose a joseki in relation to the board as a whole is the theme of this debate. Three proposals are being made for White's next move: which one fits this opening best?




Dia. 1


A: I advocate connecting as in Dia. 1. I believe there is a proverb to the effect that 'even a moron connects against a peep.' White is perfectly safe if he connects solidly like this.

B: These proverbs have to be taken with a grain of salt. Anyone can see that Black wants White to connect. Go is a competitive game; White ought to do what Black doesn't want, namely resist with 1 in Dia. 2.


C: I agree with B that White ought to resist, but I disagree with his choice of moves. White 1 in Dia. 3 is better. You should always try to play toward the outside, not the inside. From that point of view, Dia. 1 is the worst move, Dia. 2 is better, but Dia. 3 is best.



Dia. 2



Fuseki Analysis




Fuseki Analysis

As always, the first step in choosing a joseki is to analyze the two adjacent sides.

The right side. The black group in the top right corner has an extremely settled shape, anchored by the circled stone on the third line. Since its shape is already complete, no further move by either side will have much effect in this area.

If Black's shape were more open, as in Dia. 1 say, White could aim at attacking it from underneath, but with the circled stone in place, his aim is blocked. The right side is a region to avoid. 'Don't play toward thickness.'




Dia. 1

The lower side. Since White can press Black down at 'a', he holds the dominating influence on the lower side. This influence works in the direction shown by the arrow.

From the above considerations, White should choose a joseki that steers away from the right side and toward the lower side, so —

B Wins the Debate

Dia. 2. White 1 abandons the right side in return for influence toward the bottom and center. A prerequisite for this move is that if Black replies at 'a', White must be able to ladder him with 'b', but here the ladder works. (If anyone




Dia. 2


ever plays White 1 against you when the ladder is not working, do not hesitate cut at 'a'.) Let's see how this joseki continues.

Dia. 3. Assuming that the ladder is against him so he cannot cut, Black should hane at 2.


Dia. 4. White must not block at 1. Black's cut at 2 becomes an atari enabling Black to capture two of White's stones with 4. This is a bad result for White.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 5. Therefore after Dia. 3, White should hane at 3 and let Black play 4. The right side now loses all further value.

Dia. 6. White continues with the contact play at 5, and answers Black 6 by jumping to 7.




Dia. 6




Dia. 7

Dia. 7. If Black is cooperative enough to give atari at 1, White replies with 2.

Dia. 8. After connecting at 6, White has a magnificent outer position.




Dia. 8



Dia. 9


Dia. 9. Note that if White omits 5 and 7 in Dia. 6, Black should attack with 1, striking at White's angle point.

Dia. 10. We have seen the joseki; now let's see how it fits into the opening. White was not interested in the right side to begin with, so Black 2 and 4 cause him no pain. He gladly switches to the bottom with 5 and 7. Black will



Dia. 10

probably respond at 8, to avoid being pressed down there, and White should defend at 9. He has an excellent formation on the lower side. Joseki and fuseki could hardly combine together better than this.



Dia. 11


Dia. 11. When White plays 1, Black may well counter with a ladder block at 2, threatening to cut at 'a'. White should reply at 3; the position in the top left corner is such that letting Black make two consecutive moves is not particularly harmful. In fact, after White 7 both sides have four stones apiece in this corner and are following a standard joseki, which continues with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. In the bottom right, White's continuation is now 'd'.

Dia. 12. (next page) If White connects at 1 (A's proposal), Black will play 2. White's extension to 3 brings this joseki to a close, but Black follows with a beautiful combined extension and pincer on the lower side at 4. The game is turned completely around from Dia. 10. Black has the initiative and the advantage.


White 3, which approaches Black's thickness, is a most unappealing move. It suffers horribly in comparison with Black 4. Accordingly —

Dia. 13. After Black 2, White may try preempting Black on the lower side with 3. Black naturally attacks at 4, and now the effect of his peeping move becomes apparent.

What precisely is the effect of this peep?




Dia. 12




Dia. 13

Dia. 14. These are the initial moves of the joseki in which Black peeps at 6.




Dia. 14




Dia. 15

Dia. 15. This is the joseki when Black does not peep. There are three major differences to note.

Dia. 16. The first is that in Dia. 14, with Black 1 on the third line, the lower side is played out. In Dia. 16, however, with the triangled stone on the fourth line, the lower side is an area with considerable potential for development.




Dia. 16




Dia. 17

Dia. 17. The second difference is that the peep and connection make White heavier, so that if he omits the extension to 'a', Black 1 becomes severe.

Dia. 18. If Black attacks at 1 in this diagram, White can jump lightly out to 2. After this, if Black peeps at 3 White will definitely not connect at 'a'.



Dia. 18




Dia. 19

Dia. 19. He will dodge with 4. In other words, White's shape is more flexible in Dia. 18 than in Dia. 17. The peep makes it hard for White to omit 'a' in Dia. 17 — it is a way of forcing him to extend there.

Dia. 20. The third difference lies in the value of a black play at ▲. In this diagram it is quite large, because an invasion at 'a' is threatened, aiming to link under at 'b'.


Dia. 21. After the circled exchange, Black 'a' is less of a threat because Black can no longer link under, and the value of the triangled stone




Dia. 20

is cut in half.

Dia. 22. Finally, note there is a contradiction in first playing 1, then trying to peep at 3. White will respond at 4, and after the sequence through 9, Black 1 has become unnecessary.




Dia. 21




Dia. 22

Dia. 23. We have yet to consider C's proposal, which was to block from above with 1. This move lets Black capture a stone in a fairly large way with 2, 4, and 6, so it is only good when White can expect a large territorial framework on the right in compensation.



Dia. 23


Dia. 24. This is one continuation, but Black has a large profit, and White's wall is rendered completely ineffective by the black position



Dia. 24

above it. White has a lost game already. He could move White 13 to 'a', but that would not change matters.

Dia. 25. What about answering Black 2 with the hane at 3? White now has the right idea, but a move too late. The result is somewhat like Dia. 10, except that White's shape is less developed, and his potential lower-side framework is open at the bottom. The fault lies with White 1, which is played in the wrong direction: toward the right instead of below. (Black 2 can also be at 3 or 'a'.)



Dia. 25

('Gekkan Gogaku', June 1980. Translated by J. Davies.)

Odd Man Out


Ogawa Tomoko 4-dan and James Davies

Problem. In each group of endgame moves below, three have the same value but one differs, either in size or in sente-gote attributes. Find the odd man out.


Example. Group 1, move A.

Dia. 1. White plays first. White 1 is gote, and 2-3 is the standard assumption to make for counting purposes.

Dia. 2. Black plays first. Black 1-3 is gote, and 4-5 is the standard way to finish up later. The difference between this result and Dia. 1 is three points on each side (the points marked 'x' plus one white prisoner), so Black or White




Dia. 1




Dia. 2


1 is worth six points in gote. Two of the other three moves (White B, C, and D) are also worth six points in gote, but one is different. The odd man out is —?




Group 1. White to play



Group 2. Black to play



Group 3. Black to play



Group 4. White to play


Solutions

Group 1. The odd man out is B.

A. 6 points in gote


As shown on the previous page.

B. 8 points in gote.



White plays first


2: elsewhere




Black plays first

In both diagrams 1 is gote and the other moves represent the standard assumption as to how the position will be finished later. The difference is one white prisoner (two points) and six other points, making eight in all. Black or White 1 is two points larger than the other moves in this group.

C. 6 points in gote




White plays first




Black plays first

White 1 makes two points and keeps two prisoners = four points from falling to Black.

D. 6 points in gote



White plays first




Black plays first

3: connects


In the diagram at left, White gains one prisoner but no territory: one point. In the diagram at right Black gains three prisoners but only two points of territory, since he has to connect at Δ : five points. One plus five equals six. (White 2 will be played later.)

Group 2. The odd man out is C.

A. 2 points in sente




Black plays first




White plays first

In the diagram at left, if White omits 4, Black makes a deadly throw-in at the right of 2. Black 1 thus reduces White's territory by two points in sente.

B. 2 points in sente




Black plays first




White plays first

Black 1 reduces White's territory by two points in sente.

C. 9 points in gote



Black plays first




White plays first

Black 1 captures three stones. If White connects at 3, Black cuts above 2, so White's best reply is 2 (the 2-3 exchange can be left for later). Black 1 earns a large gain in gote, as compared to a small gain in sente for moves A, B, and D. The reader can verify the precise value of 9 points for himself.

D. 2 points in sente

If White ignores Black 1 in the left diagram at the top of the next page, he loses three stones to Black 'a'. Black 1 is therefore sente, and gains two points as compared with White 1.

C. 4 points in gote




White plays first

Black plays first
2: elsewhere

This position may have been difficult to count, but as the diagrams show, it is worth four points in gote: the two points marked 'x' and two more for the black prisoner. In the right diagram, the 3–4 exchange is a reasonable assumption after Black 1.

D. 4 points in gote



White plays first
2: elsewhere

Black plays first
2: elsewhere

In both diagrams 1 is gote and 3 is sente afterwards. The difference is two points of territory on each side, making four in all. There is a tendency to think that this play is worth only two points, but it is actually twice that big.

Go Curiosity

1-dan v. 9-dan




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

White: Shinkai Hiroko 1-dan

Black: Sugiuchi Masao 9-dan

5th Meijin tournament, 2nd prelim. section

komi: 5½; played on the 12th April, 1979

The above game is quite a curiosity, for it is the first official game played on even between a 1-dan and a 9-dan in the history of the Nihon Ki-in. Shinkai Hiroko, who was twenty-one when she played this game, is a disciple of Iwamoto 9-dan and is regarded as one of the most promising of the recent crop of woman professionals. In order to play Sugiuchi she had to win four games




Figure 2 (51 – 121)

straight in the 3rd preliminary section of the Meijin tournament, thus winning her way into the 2nd section, into which the higher-ranked players are seeded. For a 1-dan to get into the 2nd section is not so unusual, but the coincidence of drawing a 9-dan as opponent is. Incidentally, the theoretical handicap for a 1-dan against a 9-dan would be three stones, but in practice the handicap adopted in occasional unofficial games is two stones.

Figure 1. White 18. The ladder after Black cuts at 29 has to be favourable for White to play this joseki.

White 40. Extending at 41 would be better.

White 46 is thin — White 'a' is better.

White 50 is perhaps the losing move. White should play 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f', Black 'g', thus enabling White to extend to 'h'.


Figure 2. Black 51 is a severe attack which seizes the initiative.

White 60. If omitted, Black captures the key stones with 72.

White 70. Though it would leave a lot of bad aji, extending at 93 would be more aggressive and would help White more in the centre.

Black 119. If omitted, White lives with 'a'.

Black 21 secures a connection. Changing White



Dia. 1

20 to 1 in Dia. 1 does not work either. Thanks to the ▲ stone. Black is able to capture White with the sequence to 12.

White resigns after Black 121.

Forcing Moves

Sakai Masanori 4-dan and James Davies

In this series of articles we are classifying would-be forcing moves into three categories:


(1) True forcing moves, that benefit the player and force his opponent.

(2) Thank-you moves, that force, but benefit the wrong side.


(3) Blunders, that backfire completely.

This time we shall be examining ataris, and it is not hard to find samples from each of the categories above.

Dia. 1. In this position, for instance —




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Black 1 is usually considered a true forcing move. White must reply at 2, and Black now turns elsewhere. The benefit of the exchange is that —

Dia. 3. If White later plays 1, Black 2 is sente; White has to respond at 3. That gives Black time to defend his shape with 4.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. If Black failed to force as in Dia. 2, Black 2 would be gote, leaving Black vulnerable to the cut at 3.

Dia. 5. This position, which the American author once encountered, appears similar. White is threatening to save his corner stone with 'a'. Black would like to prevent that with a forcing move.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

3 elsewhere

Dia. 7. Sakai: 'You were giving you opponent a fairly large gift. I hope he said "Thank you." Why didn't you just descend at 1? Suppose White makes the same reply at 2: would you rather have your stone at 1 or 'a'? White will actually play 2 at 'a', but you're still better off that way than at the end of Dia. 6. You can't play go by rote pattern recognition. You have to think.'




Dia. 7




Dia. 8


Dia. 9. For an example of a blunder, we can take this Black 1. Black wants to force White to make an empty triangle with 'a' before descending at 'b' to capture the corner. This is a beautiful idea, but —



Dia. 9




Dia. 10




Dia. 11

Dia. 11. Black should of course forget about forcing and just descend at 1.


Forcing move, thank-you move, or blunder: see if you can classify the five moves in the next column.




1.




2.



3.




4.




5.

1. Forcing move

Dia. 1. White 1 follows the maxim that says to force before living. Black will definitely connect at 2, and then White must defend his corner (3 is best). Black has been forced to make an empty triangle, and White 1 is left as a potentially effective cutting stone.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

13: connects

Dia. 2. If White simply played 1, then tried to force Black later at 5 — after Black 2 and 4, perhaps — Black would not be bound to connect at 11. He could squeeze with 6 and 8 instead. After the sequence through 14, White is hurting badly on the outside and White 1 has become unnecessary in the corner.


2. Thank-you move

Dia. 3. White 1 is a life-saving move — for Black. After 3 and 4, Black's corner is clearly alive.



Dia. 3


Dia. 4. If White just drew back at 1, Black would be dead.



Dia. 4


3. Forcing move

Dia. 5. Black 1 is the type of move you should play without an instant's hesitation. The 1–2 exchange is completely in Black's favor, and if White plays 2 anywhere else, Black can capture there in sente and then need not defend at 3.



Dia. 5


Dia. 6. If Black just defends at 1, there is a strong probability that White will reply at 2. His position is now vastly better than in Dia. 5.




Dia. 6

4. Blunder

Dia. 7. Black 1 simply does not work. White answers with a counter-atari at 2. If Black takes the ko with 3, White gives atari again at 4. Black 1 and 3 are lost; Black cannot connect. All he has been doing is helping to improve White's position.



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Dia. 8. If Black is going to play here, he should do something more constructive. Black 1, 3, and 5 are correct.


5. Forcing move

Dia. 9. The natural way for White to play this position is to sacrifice two stones with 3 and 5 and take compensation to the left. White 1 is a forcing preliminary to this operation. One benefit of the 1–2 exchange is that White can later extend safely to ‘a’.




Dia. 9

Dia. 10. Compare the result when White plays 1 to 5 without forcing. White ‘a’ is no longer a good move. Black can cut behind it with ‘b’.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Dia. 11. If Black objects to being forced, he can answer White 1 at 2 and link under with 4, but after White 5 and Black 6, White gets to extend to 7 or thereabouts, so this is at least as good for him as *Dia. 9*.

Go in Lilliput

James Davies


The first Lilliputian who condescended to play go with Gulliver was one Flimnap, the Royal Treasurer.

‘Naturally I shall take White,’ Flimnap announced after explaining the rules.

‘Fair enough, since I can hardly see the board,’ replied Gulliver.

The first twenty-two moves of their first game are shown in *Dia. 1*.

‘I see you’ve fallen for my favorite tesuji,’ said Flimnap after expertly sacrificing three




20 at 14. 21 at 16

Dia. 1


stones and connecting at 22. ‘I suggest you resign here.’

‘I prefer to play on,’ said Gulliver, and not only did he play on, he won by seven points. After that they played four more games, alternating black and white, and at the crucial point in each game, Gulliver was able to come up


with a winning move, which was not perhaps a very wise thing to do with a high-ranking Court official for an opponent. Anyway, let the reader see if he can match Gulliver’s performance.




1. Black to play and win.
prisoners: ○○○




2. White to play and win.



3. Black to play and win.




4. White to play and win.




5. Black to play and win.

ANSWERS

1. Answer. Gulliver hanged at 1. After 3, White had to give atari at 4 and Black linked under at 5. If White had tried to stop Black 5, Black would have connected at 4, making an eye against nothing.




1. Answer
7: takes 6




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: continuation. Black 9 prevented a white throw-in at 9. Despite losing his cutting stones, Black ended with seven more points of territory than White.

2. Answer. White cuts at 1 and descends at 3. The best response is Black 4, but that leaves White six points in the lead.



2. Answer




Dia. 1

4: throw-in at $\triangle$


5: takes 4. 7: connects

Dia. 1: variation. Flimnap did not play Black 4 in the answer diagram. He gave atari with 1 and fought to the finish. The finish was that all of his stones were dead.

Answer 3. Black 1 is the winning tesuji. If White replies at 2, Black plays 3 through 7 and comes out two points ahead.




3. Answer



Dia. 1

Dia. 1: variation. If White replies this way, Black cuts at 2 and wins by much more than two points.

Answer 4. How many players would think of cutting at 1 before blocking at 3, so as to leave a ko threat at 7? This enables White to retake the ko with 9. Black has no ko threats, so he can



4. Answer


9: ko. 10: pass

11: connects


only pass and let White connect. White wins by one point.

Dia. 1: failure. If White simply plays 1, he loses the ko and with it his victory.

Answer 5. Black wins if he lives in the bottom left corner, and he lives if he occupies the two-two point with 1. White makes his strongest attack at 4, but to no avail. Black should finish four points ahead.




5. Answer




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: failure. If Black blocks at 1, White gets the key point at 4. Black widens his eye space to the limit with 5, but White kills him with 6 and 8. Next, the points above 4 and below 8 are miai.

Dia. 2: failure. This Black 1 loses on shortage of liberties — after 8, Black cannot give atari at the right of 4. Just for the record, if Black plays 1 at 6, White kills him with 5; if Black plays 1 at 5, White kills him with 1; and if Black plays 1 between 1 and 8, White kills him with 4.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Dia. 3: failure. If Black tries to kill White, White plays 2 and 4 and wins the capturing race (verification left to the reader).

For the consequences of beating the Royal Treasurer in five straight games, see Jonathan Swift's account of Gulliver's travels.

Page from Go History

International Go in the Edo Period (ii)

The Second Ryukyu Mission

The visit by Peichin Hamahika to Edo in 1682 seems to have served as a stimulus to the development of go in the Ryukus and by the time of the 5th Honinbo, Dochi, the level had improved considerably. When another tributary mission was sent to Edo in 1710, the top Ryuku player, a fifteen year old prodigy named Yara no Satonoshi, was sent also to test his skill in a second international match. Satonoshi was even stronger than Hamahika, so high hopes were held for him. Once again, the Shimazu clan of Satsuma, which monopolised trade with the Ryukus, arranged for government permission for the match and Satonoshi played Dochi on the 1st December, 1710, on three stones. This game is regarded as a model handicap game for White and Satonoshi was forced to resign after 193 moves (it is given in 'Appreciating Famous Games').

Satonoshi applied to play another game and this time it was arranged for him to play on black against the twelve year old Aihara Kaseki, who was probably 5-dan. Aihara, born in 1698, was a disciple of the 4th Inoue, Inoue Dosetsu Inseki, who had been Dochi's guardian and who had become Meijin in 1708 (actually he used the occasion of issuing a diploma to Satonoshi to engineer his appointment as godokoro — see GW13). Aihara Kaseki was quite a prodigy and the year before he had been granted a generous stipend by the government. As an adult, however, he did not fulfil his youthful promise, although he did reach 7-dan. He served as instructor and chief clerk to the Honinbo house during its lean period in the middle of the 18th century and he taught the 6th, 7th and 8th Honinbos, Chihaku, Shuhaku and Hakugen. The date of his death is not clear, but his last recorded game was played in 1763.

Satonoshi played on josen (black in all games) against Aihara, which, if the latter was a 5-dan, would be the handicap for a 3-dan.

White: Aihara Kaseki

Black: Yara no Satonoshi

date: 9th December, 1710

White wins by 2 points.

(The commentary, by the late Kubomatsu Katsukiyo 9-dan, was first published in the Jan. 1936






Figure 1 (1 - 53)

49: connects



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

'Kido')

Figure 1 (1 - 53)

White 6 etc. A standard Edo period joseki. Note that pushing up at 14 immediately with 12 is unreasonable, as Black will cut above 10.

Black 19 aims at cutting at 'a' or peeping at 'b'.

Black 21 is a big point. Black could also play solidly, defending his cutting point with 'c'.

White 28 and 30 are the correct order. If White plays 1 in Dia. 1 first, Black will play 2 and 4, forcing White into bad shape. Playing Black 29 at 1 in Dia. 2 does not have this effect. In fact, the result there would turn Black 27 in the figure into a bad move.

White 42 etc. This sequence, still one of the standard ways of handling this position, seems to have been established in this period.

Black 51 defends the black stones at the centre bottom and prepares to connect underneath to 43 in case of need, while also setting up the attack at 53.





Figure 2 (54 - 100)
89: connects



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (54 - 100)

White 54 is submissive. White could have settled his group by playing a sacrifice at 1 in Dia. 3, then cutting with 3 and 5.

White 62. Since Black 63 is a severe cut, White should have tried a little harder here. For example, playing a probe at 'a' would have been an interesting idea. White does not yet seem to be taking his opponent very seriously.

White 66 is obviously bad style, but White cannot give atari at 67 because of the threat of Black 'b'. When he makes a second cut at 71, the game is going very well for Black. Black 71 is properly aggressive; Black 'c' would also be adequate but not as interesting.

White chooses to defend at 80, though this lets Black attack with 81 etc. White just barely manages to live with the squeeze from 82, but Black is left with a large move at 'd'.

Black 95. Attacking the corner group's eye-shape with 'e' would meet with a severe counter-attack by White at 'f'.

Black 99. If at 'g', White has an excellent peep at 'h' which would serve to cover his weak




Figure 3 (101 - 150)

ko (above 9): 12, 39; 41: connects; 48: ko (at 36)

point to the left of 75.

White 100. White could also try attacking Black on a large scale with White 'i', Black 'j', White 'k'.

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

Black 27. If at 28, White can play inside at 47.


White 28. If White attacks with 1 in Dia. 4, Black can counter with 2 to 6.

White 32 is bad. If White blocked at 'a', Black would not be able to switch elsewhere after 38.


Black 43 is a large point, as it has the follow-up at 49. Black is prepared for a ko in the top left.

White 44. If White had played 'a', he would be able to kill Black with the tesuji of 1 in Dia. 5. With the extra liberty he has in the game, Black can survive 1 with a hane at 'a' in the diagram. In effect, White's mistake with 32 gives Black the chance to play 43, as well as the excellent ko threat at 49.

White 50. If Black 50 were not sente, threatening to save the centre stones, White would resolve



Dia. 4



Dia. 5




Figure 4 (151 - 200)
 ko: 54, 57, 60, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75;
 77: connects; 98: connects

the ko with 50.

Figure 4 (151 - 200)

Compromising with 58 would stop White from getting any more ko threats here.

White 76. White has run out of ko threats. Moreover, he does not want Black to use 94 as a ko threat. However, securing life for this group with 77 keeps Black in the lead.

White 86. The correct endgame sequence is shown in Dia. 6. The advantage of the result in the diagram is that White has an extra liberty, as well as sente, while White 'a' will be more effective if Black does not have a stone at 'b'. White 86





Figure 5 (201 - 250)



Dia. 6




Figure 6 (251 - 295)

95: connects

is a careless mistake, but ironically it leads to White's winning the game.

Figure 5 (201 - 250)

Black 11. Black is misreading the position. If he had blocked at 12, he would probably have won the game. Black played 11 in order to cut at 19, but this move does not work.

White 24. If at 25, Black counters with 24, White 34, Black 30.

Forcing with 31 and 33 is not enough for Black. He takes gote with 35 (White 'a' would be worth seven points in gote) and 39, while capturing two stones with 45 and 47 is also gote. Black 11 decided the game.

Figure 6 (251 - 295)

White wins by 2 points.

There were a number of mistakes on both sides in this game, but it was still a splendid effort, considering the ages of the players.

Following the precedent of Hamahika, Satonoshi also applied for a diploma and was awarded the rank of 3-dan, the same as Hamahika.

Next issue: Ryukyu takes its revenge for the defeats of Hamahika and Satonoshi.

